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ARTICLE 
USING GAME THEORY AND 
CONTRACTARIANISM TO REFORM 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: WHY 
SHAREHOLDERS SHOULD SEEK 
DISINCENTIVE SCHEMES IN EXECUTIVE 
COMPENSATION PLANS 
ELIAS PETE GEORGE 
INTRODUCTION 
During the last decade, a surprising number of corporate scandals1 
led to significant shareholder losses.2  As American stock exchanges 
imploded during 2001 and 2008, outrage among shareholders prompted 
Congress to enact a new set of corporate governance laws, including the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”) and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
 Law Clerk to the Honorable Chief Judge Jennifer P. Togliatti of the Eighth Judicial 
District Court in Clark County, Nevada; Associate, Gordon Silver, as of Fall 2012; Adjunct 
Professor of Economics, College of Southern Nevada.  J.D. 2011, University of Nevada, Las Vegas, 
William S. Boyd School of Law; B.A. 2006, Economics, University of Nevada, Las Vegas.  I would 
like to thank my family and friends for their boundless love and support. I would also like to thank 
the Golden Gate University Law Review Editorial Board, without whose guidance this paper would 
not have been published.  I am particularly grateful to Professor Bradley S. Wimmer, Professor 
Keith A. Rowley, Professor Nancy B. Rapoport, Joanna M. Myers, Esq., and Gary Davis, CFP, 
CLU, ChFC who provided helpful comments and edits.  I would also like to extend a thank you to 
His Grace, Ilia Katre of Philomelion, whose constant guidance and words of wisdom prove to be 
invaluable. 
 1 For example, Enron, Adelphia, Global Crossing, Worldcom, Bear Stearns, and Lehman 
Brothers. 
 2 See Penelope Patsuris, The Corporate Scandal Sheet, FORBES.COM, (Aug. 26, 2002), 
www.forbes.com/2002/07/25/accountingtracker.html (providing a fact sheet for each company’s 
scandal and relevant charges). 
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Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank Act”).3  
SOX sought to restore public confidence in publicly traded corporations 
and public accounting firms by increasing transparency and 
accountability between shareholders and corporate managers.4  The 
Dodd-Frank Act sought to further clarify executive compensation and 
corporate governance provisions by imposing additional restrictions on 
compensation plans of publicly traded companies.5  Yet legal and 
economic scholars6 have criticized SOX and the Dodd-Frank Act for 
failing to improve corporate governance and for failing to establish 
effective incentive structures for corporate managers.7  The focus of both 
 3 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745; Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010); see Brian 
Montopoli, Obama Signs Sweeping Financial Reform into Law, CBS NEWS (July 21, 2010), 
www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-20011201-503544.html. 
 4 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745. 
 5 See HUGHES HUBBARD & REED LLP, SOX REDUX: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE 
DODD-FRANK ACT (July 2010), available at www.hugheshubbard.com/files/Publication/f3c68582-
8176-4a4b-8ea5-7841c8f021d3/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/9c728f97-47d9-4e81-ac94-
a0db52c06986/nusbacher_sox%20redux%20corporate%20governance_aug2010.pdf. 
 6 Robert Prentice, a supporter of Sarbanes-Oxley, stated that “Wall Street and its supporters 
claim that SOX . . . is damaging New York’s status as center of the financial world.”  Robert 
Prentice, Sarbanes-Oxley: The Evidence Regarding the Impact of SOX 404, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 
703 (2007).  He further observed that “SOX critics assume that when those who control U.S. 
companies take them private or those who control foreign firms drop their U.S. listing in apparent 
efforts to evade SOX’s requirements, they are acting in the best interests of the firm.”  Id. at 704; see 
also John C. Coates IV, The Goals and Promise of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 91 
(2007) (“Sarbanes-Oxley has been attacked as a costly regulatory overreaction.”); Cheryl L. Wade, 
Sarbanes-Oxley Five Years Later: Will Criticism of SOX Undermine Its Benefits?, 55 LOY. U. CHI. 
L.J. 595, 595-96 (2008) (noting that “the business community’s criticism of SOX is almost virulent,” 
as evidenced by a large number of surveys taken of those in academics and business); J.C. Boggs et 
al., Dodd-Frank at One Year: Growing Pains, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. ONLINE 52 (2011), available at 
www.hblr.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/Boggs-Foxman-Nahill-Growing-Pains.pdf (providing a 
brief analysis of Democratic and Republican arguments for and against Dodd-Frank); The Dodd-
Frank Act: Too Big Not to Fail, ECONOMIST, Feb. 18, 2012, available at 
www.economist.com/node/21547784 (arguing that “there is an ever-more-apparent risk that the 
harm done by the massive cost and complexity of [Dodd-Frank’s] regulations, and the effects of its 
internal inconsistencies, will outweigh what good may yet come from it.”); Eric Dash, Feasting on 
Paperwork, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2001, available at www.nytimes.com/2011/09/09/business/dodd-
frank-paperwork-a-bonanza-for-consultants-and-lawyers.html?pagewanted=all (describing how 
Dodd-Frank created a new legal industry that seeks to ensure corporations are in compliance: 
“Dodd-Frank Act is quickly becoming such a gold mine that even Wall Street bankers, never ones to 
undercharge, are complaining that the costs are running amok.”); Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, 
Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1148 (2012) (stating 
that the Dodd-Frank Act “overhauled key aspects of the [regulatory] system . . . . Yet much 
complexity remains in place. Congress did not substantially reduce or consolidate existing federal 
regulators . . . . Thus, information sharing and coordination remain significant challenges [among 
corporations] . . . .”). 
 7 See Erica Beecher-Monas, Corporate Governance in the Wake of Enron: An Examination 
of the Audit Committee Solution to Corporate Fraud, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 357, 390-91 (2003) 
(arguing that SOX “does little to change existing law, while imposing high costs on corporate 
2
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Acts on reforming only incentive-based executive compensation plans, 
rather than promulgating disincentive compensation plans, has failed to 
assure shareholders that corporate managers will comply with their 
fiduciary duties, specifically their duty of loyalty. 
In light of the 2008 financial crisis, the debate in corporate 
governance of how best to incentivize corporate managers to serve the 
interests of shareholders intensified.8  The collapse of Bear Stearns, 
Countrywide, and Lehman Brothers, and the greatly diminished power of 
Bank of America, CitiBank, and AIG heightened this demand for reform.  
President Barack Obama echoed this concern during his inaugural 
speech, saying, “our economy is badly weakened, a consequence of 
greed and irresponsibility on the part of some.”9  Later that summer, in 
an effort to reform corporate governance, President Obama unveiled his 
financial regulatory reform package.10  Senator Charles E. Schumer (D-
N.Y.), a strong proponent of Wall Street, responded with a letter to 
Kenneth Feinberg, the Special Master for TARP11 Executive 
Compensation, writing that this reform was only the “tip of the iceberg,” 
and urging a more significant overhaul.12 
Less than a year later, the Obama administration responded with the 
Dodd Financial Reform Bill.13  The bill sought in part to provide 
shareholders with non-binding votes on executive compensation and to 
require that directors of public companies be elected by a majority of 
shareholders”).  “Studies of corporate compliance have illustrated their ineffectiveness in deterring 
corporate misconduct, due to the pervasiveness of agency costs, incentives to shift the locus of 
liability further down the corporate hierarchy, [and] tendencies to make cosmetic rather than real 
changes.”  Id. 
 8 Carl C. Icahn, The Economy Needs Corporate Governance Reform, WALL ST. J., Jan. 23, 
2009, at A13. 
 9 Transcript, Barack Obama’s Inaugural Address, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2009, available at 
www.nytimes.com/2009/01/20/us/politics/20text-obama.html. 
 10 DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM 86–89 (June 17, 2009), 
available at http://documents.nytimes.com/obama-s-plan-for-financial-regulatory-reform#document. 
 11 Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) was signed into law by President George W. Bush 
on October 3, 2008 and was aimed at addressing the subprime mortgage crisis by purchasing assets 
and equity from financial institutions “to strengthen market stability, improve the strength of 
financial institutions, and enhance market liquidity.”  Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) 
Information, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS. (Sept. 14, 2011), 
www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/tarpinfo.htm. 
 12 Letter from Charles E. Schumer, U.S. Senator, to Kenneth Feinberg, Special Master for 
TARP Executive Compensation (Oct. 22, 2009), available at http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-
room/news/64321-schumer-pens-letter-supporting-exec-pay-cuts-more-reforms. 
 13 Damian Paletta, Dodd Bill to Toughen Stance Against Banks, WALL ST. J., Mar. 14, 2010, 
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703780204575120393616196 
162.html?mod=rss_whats_news_us&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=
Feed%3A+wsj%2Fxml%2Frss%2F3_7011+%28WSJ.com%3A+What%27s+News+US%29&utm_c
ontent=Google+Reader. 
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votes cast by shareholders.14  The Council of Institutional Investors 
(“CII”), a nonprofit association that champions strong shareholder rights 
and good corporate governance,15 applauded the bill as “an important 
step in the right direction” toward corporate governance reform.16  CII 
warned that “improving the regulatory system alone is not enough”; 
efforts must also be made to rein in corporate manager malfeasance.17  In 
July 2010, President Obama signed into law the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, remarking that the Act 
“demand[ed] accountability and responsibility from everyone,” including 
corporate managers.18 
Over the last two decades, there has been a great deal of academic 
literature examining how Congress and federal regulatory bodies—
chiefly the Securities and Exchange Commission—can better effectuate 
corporate governance regulations.19  Many have applied a behavioral 
economics approach,20 which has gained momentum in recent years.21  
Others have incorporated lessons from public-choice theory,22 while 
some have called for continued regulation23 or immediate deregulation,24 
 14 Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2009, 111th Cong. (1st Sess.) §§ 951-959 
(tit. IX(E), Accountability and Executive Compensation), 971-974 (tit. IX(G), Strengthening 
Corporate Governance), available at http://banking.senate.gov/public/_files/AYO09D44_xml.pdf. 
 15 About the Council, COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS, www.cii.org/about (last 
visited Apr. 10, 2012). 
 16 Press Release, Council of Institutional Investors, CII Applauds Senate Corporate 
Governance Reforms, (Mar. 15, 2010), available at www.cii.org/UserFiles/file/03-15-
10%20Response%20to%20Dodd%20Reg%20Reform%20Bill.pdf. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Brian Montopoli, Obama Signs Sweeping Financial Reform into Law, CBS NEWS, 
available at www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-20011201-503544.html (lasted visited Mar. 28, 
2012). 
 19 See, e.g., Benedict Sheehy, Scrooge—The Reluctant Stakeholder: Theoretical Problems in 
the Shareholder-Stakeholder Debate, 14 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 193 (2005) [hereinafter Sheehy, 
Scrooge—The Reluctant Stakeholder]. 
 20 Kent Greenfield, Using Behavioral Economics to Show the Power and Efficiency of 
Corporate Law as Regulatory Tool, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 581 (2002); see, e.g., Erica Beecher-
Monas, Corporate Governance in the Wake of Enron: An Examination of the Audit Committee 
Solution to Corporate Fraud, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 357, 390-91 (2003). 
 21 Greenfield, Using Behavioral Economics to Show the Power and Efficiency of Corporate 
Law as Regulatory Tool, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 583, 586 n.13 (“If one could invest in areas of legal 
scholarship, ‘behavioral law and economics’ (BLE) would be a growth stock.”). 
 22 See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Community and Statism: A Conservative Contractarian 
Critique of Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 856, 899-901 (1997). 
 23 See, e.g., Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate 
Governance: Reflections upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859 (2003) (stating that federal 
regulation helps to effectively reduce agency costs and remove abuse by corporate managers who 
have broadened their power under state law). 
 24 See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities 
Regulation, 107 YALE L. J.  2359 (1998) (arguing in favor of a market-oriented approach of 
competitive federalism to expand, not reduce, role of individual states in securities regulation). 
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and a few have even gone so far as to argue that a corporation is not a 
mechanism to maximize shareholder value, but rather an instrument of 
the state aimed to maximize societal utility.25  None of these models, 
however, satisfactorily answer how best to structure corporate actors’ 
incentives and disincentives to best serve the interest of shareholders.26  
This Article employs a model of game theory, a progeny of neoclassical 
economics, to advocate a novel solution—the inclusion of disincentive 
provisions in executive compensation contracts. 
Currently, the importance of judge-made law in corporate 
governance and how shareholders should strategically react to these 
rulings is often overlooked.  Legislatures lack expertise in how best to 
structure a corporation; therefore, they provide for organizational gaps27 
to be filled by judicial intervention.28  This allows lawyers and corporate 
actors to more easily react to changes within corporate governance.29  
For example, though statutory law provides a multitude of protections 
inherent in the corporate form,30 especially limited liability, the law 
protecting investors who stand “in vulnerable dependence upon the 
superior knowledge and capacities” of management is grounded in the 
courts.31  Given the potential for abuse by corporate managers who are 
entrusted with others’ assets, courts have established standards of good-
faith dealing.32  These fiduciary duties are an attempt to effectively 
 25 See, e.g., Sheehy, Scrooge—The Reluctant Stakeholder, 14 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. at 201. 
 26 Given the primacy of statutory law over judge-made law in matters of corporate 
governance, theorems also readily focus on mandating change by seeking legislative reform.  
Unsurprisingly, this has produced myopic solutions that are overly dependent upon cookie-cutter 
reform packages. 
 27 Often there is an absence of statutory language that specifically addresses areas of 
corporate law, especially since public corporations operate in an ever-changing business 
environment.  As a result, courts are often given the task of examining legislative intent and the plain 
meaning of the words in a statute to make substantive rulings and to fill in the gaps left behind by 
legislatures. 
 28 JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW 
OF THE UNITED STATES, 1780-1970 126 (1st ed. 1970) [hereinafter HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE 
BUSINESS CORPORATION]; ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION 
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 221 (1932) (“The main rules of conduct applicable to management were 
developed out of common law and not out of statute; which may perhaps account for their 
development along lines which seem, to the detached observer, more healthy than those of statutes 
[in terms of flexibility and adaptability].”). 
 29 HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION at 126. 
 30 See, e.g., STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 2 (2002) 
(discussing six valuable characteristics corporations provide: formal creation provided by statute, 
legal personality, separation of ownership and control, free transferability of investor assets, 
indefinite duration, and limited liability for investors). 
 31 HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION at 128. 
 32 Id. 
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manage the divergent interests between shareholders and management.33  
Court opinions, however, have become replete with inefficiencies and 
corporate governance has been negatively impacted at the expense of 
shareholders.34  These rulings have skewed fiduciary duties in favor of 
management, leaving shareholders subject to the whims of corporate 
managers.35 
Employing a model of game theory, this Article shows how current 
judge-made law in areas of the duty of loyalty does not adequately 
prevent corporate managers from violating their fiduciary duty.  This 
Article presents a solution, advising shareholders to reform corporate 
governance through executive compensation contracts that would 
properly incentivize corporate managers to comport with their duty of 
loyalty.  Part I examines the rise of contractarianism, the prominent legal 
academic view of a corporation that helps to guide judicial interpretation 
of corporate law pertaining to managers’ fiduciary duties.  Part II 
examines agency costs, a subset of transaction costs, and the role of 
fiduciary duties.  Part III employs lessons from game theory to show how 
courts have effectively created incentives for managers to violate their 
duty of loyalty.  And Part IV examines how executive compensation 
contracts can be structured to properly incentivize managers to comply 
with their fiduciary duties. 
I.  THE RISE OF CONTRACTARIANISM 
Historically, there have been several competing theories of the law 
of corporations.36  Prior to the Great Depression, natural entity theory 
viewed a corporation as an entity itself, with an existence separate from 
its shareholders and corporate managers.37  Following the Great 
Depression, scholars advocated viewing a corporation as a natural person 
with social obligations, even if that meant a reduction in profits.38  
Today, the most prominent legal academic view of a corporation is 
contractarianism.39  Contractarianism views a corporation not as entity 
 33 ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 4.1 (1986). 
 34 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Manager’s Discretion and Investors’ Welfare: Theories and 
Evidence, 9 DEL. J. CORP. L. 540, 549 (1984) (discussing the “race to the bottom” phenomenon). 
 35 Id. 
 36 David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 201-04 (1990). 
 37 Id. at 202.  “This view perceived the corporation as an entity . . . and emphasized the 
state’s constitutive role.”  Id.  In other words, this view focused on the state using its “charter[ed] 
authority to impose substantive regulations on corporate activity.”  Id. 
 38 Id. at 203 (“[A]dvocates of corporate social responsibility seized on [this] theory in the 
wake of the Depression and used it as a basis for arguments in favor of corporate citizenship idea.”). 
 39 Id. at 202-03.  While David Millon did not use the word “contractarianism,” he stated that 
“the corporation [i]s a mere aggregation of natural individuals without a separate existence.”  Id. 
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itself, but rather as a collection of contractual relationships between 
shareholders and corporate managers.40  This contractarian model 
provides a sounder approach in protecting shareholders’ interests because 
it focuses attention on the role of transactional costs within these 
contractual relationships.  A historical analysis of the rise of 
contractarianism follows, as it helps to better understand the role of 
transactional costs within the context of corporate governance. 
A corporation is a creature of statute41 that pools money from 
shareholders, and labor from executives and employees, with the primary 
goal of maximizing investments.42  Today, corporations in the United 
States have become an invaluable tool in facilitating economic growth, 
accounting for almost 90% of all business receipts43 and holding over 
$29 trillion of assets.44  Given the economic magnitude of these entities 
in combination with their legal construct, the study of corporate law has 
interested both legal and economic scholars.45 
A.  NEOCLASSICAL ECONOMICS APPROACH TO THE FIRM 
Neoclassical economics dominated and continues to maintain a 
stronghold over the study of the corporation, viewing this legal construct 
as a subset of a firm.46  A firm, in its most basic form, can simply be 
described as a collection of labor lacking substantial internal market 
 40 Id. at 202-03 (asserting that this view seeks “an anti-regulatory conception of corporate 
law that protect[s] the financial interests of shareholders from any special restrictions on their 
property rights”).  Further, advocates of contractarianism view a corporation through a lens of neo-
classical economics, and “used the freedom-of-contract metaphor to support their shareholder 
primacy, anti-regulatory policy objectives.”  Id. 
 41 See Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530, 536 (1922) (finding the 
corporation to be a “creature of the law”). 
 42 Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The 
Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416, 1420-21 (1989) [hereinafter Easterbrook & Fischel, 
Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law]. 
 43 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 3 (2011), 
available at www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/12statab/business.pdf. 
 44 BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FLOW OF FUNDS ACCOUNTS OF THE 
UNITED STATES: FLOWS AND OUTSTANDINGS FOURTH QUARTER 2011 tbl.B.102, at 107 (Mar. 8, 
2012), available at www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/current/z1.pdf (showing balance sheet assets 
of $29.95 trillion). 
 45 William T. Allen, Contracts and Communities in Corporation Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 1395, 1399 (1993) (asserting that both legal and economic scholarship have converged to 
“dominate the academic study of corporate law”); Stephen Bainbridge, Community and Statism: A 
Conservative Contractarian Critique of Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship, 82 CORNELL L. 
REV. 857-59 (1997). 
 46 Thomas S. Ulen, The Coasean Firm in Law and Economics, 18 J. CORP. L. 301, 303 
(1993); Easterbrook & Fischel, Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. at 
1424. 
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forces that both derives benefits via specialization and incurs costs via 
“agency costs.”47  A corporation is a financial tool in which investors 
bear the risk and hold claim against the firm’s income and are otherwise 
removed from the productive activities of the firm.48  This division of 
labor between employers (shareholders) and employees (management) 
diversifies risk49 through specialization while minimizing transaction 
costs.50  Transactional costs are often defined as “the costs involved in 
organizing economic activity through voluntary exchange.”51 
The neoclassical approach rests upon three fundamental economic 
teachings: 1) the specialization of tasks through the division of labor;52 
2) the benefits derived from the aggregation of capital;53 and 3) the 
lowering of costs and higher production levels resulting from economies 
of scale.54 
For almost 100 years the neoclassical approach to corporate law has 
dominated both legal and economic academia and has provided a 
 47 This phenomenon simply refers to the monitoring of employees, bonding, and residual 
costs.  For an excellent discussion clearly distinguishing a firm from a corporation, see Easterbrook 
& Fischel, Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. at 1424.  A firm may be a 
large conglomerate or an individual, single-owner proprietary business. 
 48 Id. at 1425. 
 49 Employees risk their own physical bodies, time and labor, whereas investors bear the 
financial risk yet receive a potential return. 
 50 See Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm (1937), reprinted in THE ECONOMIC 
NATURE OF THE FIRM, A READER 72, 73 (Louis Putterman & Randall S. Kroszner eds., 2d ed. 1986) 
( “Within a firm . . . market transactions are eliminated in a corporation . . . .”) [hereinafter Coase, 
The Nature of the Firm]. 
 51 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 419 (7th ed. 2007) (defining 
transaction costs as “the costs involved in organizing economic activity through voluntary 
exchange”). 
 52 Thomas S. Ulen, The Coasean Firm in Law and Economics, 18 J. CORP. L. 301, 305 
(1993).  This first economic teaching is the specialization of tasks through the division of labor.  
Given a collection of labor within a business enterprise, limited tasks can be assigned to specific 
employees where they are able to gain greater degrees of productive efficiency.  This specialization 
of tasks, which proportionately increases the productive power of labor, is rooted in the principles of 
comparative advantage.  See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE 
WEALTH OF NATIONS 43 (1776). 
 53 Ulen, The Coasean Firm in Law and Economics, 18 J. CORP. L. at 305.  The second 
economic teaching, which guides the theory of a firm, is grounded in the aggregation of capital 
goods.  Individual production has significant limitations, as it is based entirely on the savings, 
creditworthiness and human capital of a single actor.  A business enterprise, on the other hand, is 
able to raise considerable more money, maintain superior access to human capital, and more easily 
invest in technological development, while enjoying limited liability.  Id. 
 54 Id. at 305-06.  The third economic teaching rests upon the phenomenon of economies of 
scale.  Economies of scale exist when the long-run average cost curve of a corporation declines as 
output increases, and often occurs when higher production levels allow for specialization among 
employees.  Corporations rely on economies of scale to generate more profit for their shareholders; 
as a corporation grows, the cost per widget produced and sold reduces, translating into wider 
margins.  Id. 
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fundamental framework to better understand the function of 
corporations.55  Multiple rationales help to explain this dominance.56  
The theory can be deconstructed mathematically, allowing for empirical 
investigations to test the validity of various hypotheses.57  Furthermore, 
the theory can be manipulated by changing variables such as wages or 
taxes to predict how a firm will respond accordingly.  The theory has 
also survived as it has because it allows for analysis into how firms 
realistically interact with one another—imperfect competition.58 
Despite its persistence, the theory has two substantive weaknesses.  
First, neoclassical economics fails to define the arrangements within a 
firm: how production is organized, how conflicts of interest between firm 
players are resolved, and how profit is maximized.59  Pursuant to this 
shortfall, economists have famously described the firm as a “black-box,” 
where inputs are simply put in one end and outputs come out another, 
somehow maximizing profits.60  Second, the neoclassical approach fails 
to address questions concerning the firm’s size, why it splits or merges, 
and why some functions are performed in-house while others are 
contracted away.61  As economists sought to address these two 
substantive weaknesses, their work served as a catalyst to the 
development of contractarianism, beginning most notably with Ronald 
Coase’s Theory of the Firm. 
B.  RONALD H. COASE’S THEORY OF THE FIRM 
Both these weaknesses are confronted in Ronald H. Coase’s 1937 
classic article, “The Nature of the Firm.”62  Coase’s work is arguably the 
most profound piece of literature examining the internal organization of a 
corporation while also addressing why there is a firm in the theory of 
price.63  The Nobel Prize winning article64 asserted this: 
 55 See Oliver Hart, An Economist’s Perspective on the Theory of the Firm, 89 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1757, 1758 (1989). 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. 
 58 See id. 
 59 See id. 
 60 Michael Jensen & William Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency 
Costs, and Ownership Structure, in THE ECONOMIC NATURE OF THE FIRM, A READER, 209, 214-15 
(Louis Putterman & Randall S. Kroszner eds., 2d ed. 1986). 
 61 Hart, An Economist’s Perspective on the Theory of the Firm, 89 COLUM. L. REV. at 1758. 
 62 See generally Coase, The Nature of the Firm; Thomas S. Ulen, The Coasean Firm in Law 
and Economics, 18 J. CORP. L. 301, at 307; HAROLD DEMSETZ, THE ECONOMICS OF THE BUSINESS 
FIRM: SEVEN CRITICAL COMMENTARIES 1 (1995). 
 63 DEMSETZ, THE ECONOMICS OF THE BUSINESS FIRM: SEVEN CRITICAL COMMENTARIES 1 
(1995).  Price theory examines the role that prices play in consumption, taxes, saving and regulation.  
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Outside the firm, price movements direct production, which is 
coordinated through a series of exchange transactions on the market. 
Within a firm these market transactions are eliminated, and in place of 
the complicated market structure with exchange transactions is 
substituted the entrepreneur-co-ordinator, who directs production. It is 
clear that these are alternative methods of co-ordinating production. 
Yet having regard to the fact that if production is regulated by price 
movements, production could be carried on without any organization 
at all, well might we ask, why is there any organization?65 
Coase observed that market interactions (“price mechanism”) govern the 
relationships between firms, whereas interactions within a firm are made 
by “entrepreneurial coordination,” a function of economic planning, 
where resources are allocated to their most efficient use via hierarchical 
direction, not by the price mechanism.66  To illustrate this point, Coase 
demonstrated that “if a workman moves from department Y to 
department X [within a firm], he does not go because of a change in 
relative prices, but because he is ordered to do so.”67 
In presenting this theory of the firm, Coase looked primarily to 
transaction costs—”cost of transactions under the price mechanism.”68  
First, a firm comes into existence to reduce transaction costs by grouping 
labor and capital.69  For instance, absent a firm, steps of the production 
process would require separate contracts between independent businesses 
to properly coordinate resources.  Coase posits that the costs associated 
with negotiating and arranging these enforceable contracts can be 
minimized by giving one party (management) authority over the 
production process; that is, having a boss instruct employees rather than 
the employees issuing orders between themselves via contracts.70 
Second, Coase argued that functions are performed within a firm, as 
opposed to contracted away, when the costs of using the price 
mechanism to effectuate contracts and transactions are greater than the 
More definitively, price theory is a fundamental tool economists use to examine the interaction of 
two opposing players, where one seeks to maximize marginal utility while the other seeks to 
minimize marginal costs.  For an excellent critique and discussion of price theory, see MILTON 
FRIEDMAN, PRICE THEORY (2007). 
 64 Ronald H. Coase was awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Science in 1991 for 
his work in The Nature of the Firm, and The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). 
 65 Coase, The Nature of the Firm at 72-73. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. at 75. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. at 84. The allocation of resources within a firm occurs without the intervention of the 
price mechanism because of the direct connection and accountability between owners (shareholders) 
and managers.  Id. 
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costs of using direct authority.71  To better understand this relationship 
between external and internal transaction costs, Coase discussed the 
phenomenon of “diminishing returns to management.”72  As a firm gets 
larger, the responsibility of management correspondingly increases, 
reducing management’s functionality—the ability of management to 
allocate scarce resources toward their most valuable use correspondingly 
decreases.  This increases the costs of organizing additional transactions, 
thus diminishing returns.  When the marginal benefit of organizing an 
extra transaction is exceeded by the marginal cost of that additional 
transaction, a firm will cease expanding and begin contracting out each 
additional transaction.73 
Though Coase did much to expand the neoclassical approach to 
explain the inner workings and outer boundaries of a firm, he poignantly 
summed up the shortfall of his neoclassical colleagues in The Firm, the 
Market, and the Law, stating: 
Why firms exist, what determines the number of firms, what 
determines what firms do . . . are not questions of interest to most 
economists. . . . This lack of interest is quite extraordinary, given that 
most people in the United States . . . and other western countries are 
employed by firms, that most production takes place within firms, and 
that the efficiency of the whole economic system depends to a very 
considerable extent on what happens within these economic 
molecules.74 
C.  CONTRACTARIANISM: NEXUS-OF-CONTRACTS THEORY 
The genius of Coase’s theorems lay dormant for over thirty years 
until the work of Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz helped to bring his 
analysis of the firm to the forefront of legal and economic scholarship.75  
Specifically, they argued that resources within a firm are allocated to 
their most efficient use, not via the hierarchical direction as posited by 
Coase, but rather via the price mechanism.  In other words, Alchian and 
 71 Id. at 79. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Ultimately, in analyzing the nature of the firm through the transactional-cost lens, Coase 
likened the price mechanism within the market to a contract within entrepreneurial coordination: 
tools that both help to efficiently coordinate resources.  See generally id. 
 74 RONALD H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 5 (1988). 
 75 Oliver Hart, An Economist’s Perspective on the Theory of the Firm, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 
1757, 1761 (1989); Reza Dibadj, Reconceiving the Firm, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1459, 1470 (2005). 
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Demsetz suggested that the same market forces that govern the external 
affairs of a firm also govern the firm’s internal affairs. 76 
Alchian and Demsetz emphasized the importance of voluntary 
exchanges through contracts, monitored by team production, in 
coordinating intra-firm transactions.77  They were careful in identifying 
that because a firm rarely owns all of its inputs, “it has no power of fiat, 
no authority, no disciplinary action any different in the slightest degree 
from ordinary market contracting between any two people.”78  For 
instance, if an employee disobeys orders from the employer, he or she 
may be fired, sued or both.79  This is in essence the same way a 
consumer (employer) can fire his or her grocer (employee) for offering 
low-quality products, by shopping e 80
Both the Coase and Alchian-Demsetz view of a corporation placed 
emphasis on how best to effectuate relationships inside and outside a 
firm in an effort to minimize transaction costs.  Their work in examining 
what governs the external and internal affairs of a corporation helped 
give rise to contractarianism.81 
 76 Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic 
Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 778 (1972). 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. at 777-78. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. at 778. 
 81 In arguing that the same market forces govern both the external and internal affairs of a 
firm, Alchian and Demsetz explain that the difference between a consumer-grocer relationship and 
an employer-employee relationship is rooted in team production.  Cooperative productive activity is 
advantageous because the “team” is able to yield more output, often of better quality, at reduced 
transactional costs.  Id. at 780.  This reduction in transaction costs and increase in both aggregate and 
quality of goods is grounded in the theory of specialization.  To better incentivize team employees, 
remuneration should be based upon the marginal productivity of each laborer.  Marginal productivity 
is simply calculated by dividing total output by the number of laborers.  But, because both work and 
play enter into an employee’s utility function, problems of shirking (an agency cost) inevitably arise.  
Id. at 781.  Shirking is conduct of an individual that diverges from the interests of the firm, and it is 
aimed at maximizing the individual’s utility at the expense of the team’s efforts.  HAROLD DEMSETZ, 
THE ECONOMICS OF THE BUSINESS FIRM: SEVEN CRITICAL COMMENTARIES 1, 18 (1995).  As a 
result, team production presents two problems that actually increase transactional costs: monitoring 
input production and monitoring rewards to best economize incentives.  Alchian & Demsetz, 
Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. at 778. 
Alchian and Demsetz posited that the best monitoring tool is a “centralized contractual agent” (a 
“specialist”) who monitors the marginal productivity of the employees.  Id.  To best incentivize this 
specialist, Alchian and Demsetz concluded that he or she must be given five rights (ownership) in 
the firm: “(1) to be a residual claimant; (2) to observe input behavior; (3) to be the central party 
common to all contracts with inputs; (4) to alter the membership of the team; and (5) to sell [this 
bundle of] rights.”  Id. at 783.  This “bundle of rights” language has spearheaded theorems that 
characterize firms under the rubric “property rights.”  Reza Dibadj, Reconceiving the Firm, 26 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1459, 1470 (2005).  The bundle of rights, which represents a separation in 
security ownership and control between the employer and employee, is facilitated by a set of 
contracts.  Alchian & Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 
12
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While Coase, Alchian, and Demsetz laid the groundwork for 
contractarianism, Michael Jensen and William Meckling are credited 
with fathering the nexus-of-contracts theory,82 famously stating that: 
The private corporation or firm is simply one form of legal fiction 
which serves as a nexus for contracting relationships and which is also 
characterized by the existence of divisible residual claims on the assets 
and cash flows of the organization which can generally be sold 
without permission of the other contracting individuals.83 
This contractual nature of the firm, as described by Delaware Chancellor 
William T. Allen in 1993, was and remains today the prominent legal 
academic view.84 
Whereas Alchian and Demsetz focused on voluntary exchanges 
through contracts within a firm, Jensen and Meckling expanded this 
view, emphasizing that a firm is not an entity per se, but a nexus for 
contracting multiple relationships among laborers, capital providers, 
materials, and consumers.85  This “contractarian” model86 emphasizes 
AMER. ECON. REV. at 794.  The terms of these contracts form the basis of the firm and are intended 
to minimize transactional costs and maximize marginal productivity, a byproduct of team 
production.  Id.; see also DEMSETZ, THE ECONOMICS OF THE BUSINESS FIRM: SEVEN CRITICAL 
COMMENTARIES at 11. 
 82 Thomas S. Ulen, The Coasean Firm in Law and Economics, 18 J. CORP. L. 301, 306 
(1993); see Oliver Hart, An Economist’s Perspective on the Theory of the Firm, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 
1757, 1761 (1989). 
 83 Michael Jensen & William Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency 
Costs, and Ownership Structure, THE ECONOMIC NATURE OF THE FIRM, A READER, 215, n.75 (Louis 
Putterman & Randall S. Kroszner eds., 2d ed. 1986). 
 84 William T. Allen, Contracts & Communities in Corporation Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 1395, 1399 (1993); see Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 
71 F.3d 1338, 1341 (7th Cir. 1995) (“A corporation is just a nexus of contracts.”); Trenwick Am. 
Litig. Trust v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 906 A.2d 168, 195 n.75 (Del. Ch. 2006) (analyzing 
contractarianism, and adopting the view that a corporation is a nexus of contracts where corporate 
managers owe fiduciary duties to shareholders, but not the entity); New Orleans Opera Ass’n v. S. 
Reg’l Opera Endowment Fund, 993 So. 2d 791, 797-98 (La. Ct. App. 2008) (“A corporate charter or 
articles of incorporation are a contract between the corporation and its shareholders and forms a 
contractual relationship between the shareholders themselves, which sets forth rights, obligations 
and liabilities. . . . A corporation is in law a contractual creature, a nexus of contracts.”) (internal 
citations and quotation marks omitted).  Cf. Kidde Indus., Inc. v. United States, 40 Fed. Cl. 42, 55 & 
n.7 (1997) (“The modern theory of the corporation[,] which looks at corporations as fictitious 
entities, provides an excellent analytical framework in which to evaluate the economic effects of a 
corporate action.”  Furthermore, a “corporation is simply a legal fiction which serves as a nexus of 
contracts.”).  The Kidde court, however, failed to apply contractarianism to existing tax laws, 
holding instead that “tax laws treat corporations as distinct and substantive legal entities which are 
taxed separate and apart from the entities that own them.”  Id. at 55. 
 85 Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and 
Ownership Structure, THE ECONOMIC NATURE OF THE FIRM, A READER, at 216. 
 86 Stephen Bainbridge, Community and Statism: A Conservative Contractarian Critique of 
Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 856, 859 (1997). 
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this legal fiction (firm) as an aggregation of inputs, aimed at bringing 
competing interests from the market place into equilibrium to efficiently 
produce goods and services at reduced transaction costs.87  This 
equilibrium, contractarians believe, is facilitated by both express and 
implied contracts.88 
Viewing the firm as a nexus of contracts, as opposed to an entity, 
focuses attention on the complex set of contractual relationships that 
arise for different types of organizations.89  As a result, legal and 
economic scholars are better able to examine how reducing transactional 
costs within these contractual relationships can lead to greater degrees of 
economic efficiency.90 
Contractarians argue that corporations arise due to their ability to 
“reduce the costs necessary to plan, coordinate and accomplish the 
complex contracts that large-scale ongoing projects would require.”91  
The contracting parties are able to pick from a set of default terms, 
including limited liability, indefinite life, separation of ownership and 
control, and free transferability of investor shares.  These boilerplate 
terms remove bargaining costs and minimize uncertainty, thereby 
reducing transaction costs and increasing economic efficiency.92  As the 
number of parties and transactions increases, the corporation will 
continue to grow until the benefits derived from the aggregation of labor 
and capital are exceeded by the costs associated with organization.93 
Because contractarians view the corporation as an intricate set of 
long-term contracts between shareholders and corporate managers,94 they 
reject the concept that a corporation is an entity independent of its 
shareholders.  Rather, they view shareholders as an input bargained for 
 87 Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and 
Ownership Structure, THE ECONOMIC NATURE OF THE FIRM, A READER at 215-16; see Stephen M. 
Bainbridge, Contractarianism in the Business Associations Classroom: Kovacik v. Reed and the 
Allocation of Capital Losses in Service Partnerships, 34 GA. L. REV. 631, 632 (2000). 
 88 See Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 
1549 (1989); Bainbridge, Community and Statism: A Conservative Contractarian Critique of 
Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship, 82 CORNELL L. REV. at 859. 
 89 Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and 
Ownership Structure, THE ECONOMIC NATURE OF THE FIRM, A READER, at 215. 
 90 See William T. Allen, Contracts & Communities in Corporation Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 1395, 1400 (1993); Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency 
Costs, and Ownership Structure, THE ECONOMIC NATURE OF THE FIRM, A READER, at 215. 
 91 Allen, Contracts & Communities in Corporation Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. at 1400. 
 92 See Bainbridge, Contractarianism in the Business Associations Classroom: Kovacik v. 
Reed and the Allocation of Capital Losses in Service Partnerships, 34 GA. L. REV. at 635. 
 93 FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 8-9 (1991). 
 94 Id. at 90. 
14
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 3 [2012], Art. 4
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol42/iss3/4
2012] Disincentive Schemes in Executive Compensation 363 
 
and bound by voluntary contracts.95  Through these voluntary contracts, 
shareholders are the residual claimants to the firm’s assets and cash 
flows,96 exposing shareholders to the risk of loss and making them the 
sole “risk bearers” in the corporation.97  Thus, the interests of 
shareholders and corporate managers are divergent: shareholders’ 
interest lies in maximizing corporate profits, whereas corporate 
managers’ interest lies in maximizing personal monetary gain.98  This 
inherent divergence of interest is known as the “principal-agency 
problem.”99  To curtail the costs associated with the principal-agency 
problem, courts have developed fiduciary duties.100  This judge-made 
law has given rise to the structure of corporate governance, which is why 
a corporation can simply be referred to as a “contractual governance 
structure.”101 
Contractarianism provides rich insight into how corporate 
managers’ fiduciary duties best effectuate a well-organized corporate 
governance structure.102  The contract analogy helps scholars to better 
understand the role of transactional costs in the theory of the firm, 
specifically how those transactional costs may be minimized through 
more efficient contracting, thus providing a more economically sound 
corporate governance structure.  This ultimately helps shareholders, as 
 95 See Sheehy, Scrooge—The Reluctant Stakeholder, 14 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. at 226-32. 
 96 Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and 
Ownership Structure, THE ECONOMIC NATURE OF THE FIRM, A READER at 210-11. 
 97 Id. at 210. 
 98 ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
PROPERTY 123 (1932). 
 99 Id. 
 100 See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 90-93 (1991). 
 101 William T. Allen, Contracts & Communities in Corporation Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 1395, 1400 (1993).  Economists view these fiduciary duties as a vehicle that minimizes 
monitoring costs that arise from the divergent interests between shareholder ownership and corporate 
manager control.  See BERLE & MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 121 
(1932); STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 
6 (2008).  See infra Part II for discussion of why fiduciary duties help balance this risk by reducing 
transactional costs. 
 102 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW at 14 
(“To understand corporate law you must understand how the balance of advantage among devices 
for controlling agency costs [e.g., corporate manager fiduciary duties] differs across firms and shifts 
from time to time.”).  Easterbrook and Fischel also likened fiduciary principles to actual contracts, 
and explained how the study of these principles in light of contractarianism helps to better “shield” 
shareholders from disloyal corporate managers.  Id. at 92-93.  Part II of this Article discusses the role 
of corporate manager fiduciary duties in corporate governance in greater detail. 
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residual claimants, by better protecting their interests through 
strengthening corporate managers’ fiduciary duties.103 
II.  AGENCY COSTS AND THE ROLE OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES WITHIN A 
CORPORATION 
In viewing a corporation as a “nexus of contracts,” the subtle 
difference between an economic and legal analysis of a contract becomes 
noticeable.104  Economists focus primarily on the positive theory of 
agency and how best to allocate resources and incentives amongst the 
contracting parties so as to best maximize reciprocal expectations.105  In 
forming a corporation, this approach relies upon both an ex ante 
incentive-alignment method, and an ex post governance-mechanism 
approach, both of which seek to mitigate the divergent interest between 
corporate managers and shareholders that may subsequently arise.106  For 
instance, economists advocate constructing incentive-based contracts to 
compel one party, generally the corporate manager, to work in the best 
interest of another party, the shareholder.107  This contract is governed by 
(1) the threat of being fired, (2) the opportunity of being hired elsewhere, 
and (3) the free flow of information.108 
Legal practitioners, on the other hand, have adopted a broader 
interpretation of the contract known as normative contractarianism.109  
The lawyer pays “particularly close attention to the indicia of contract 
formation—offer and acceptance, an exchange of promises—ideally 
reflected in an explicit bargaining process.”110  These elements of 
contract formation are enforced both by statutory law and by the 
common law of fiduciary duty.111  Essentially, lawyers’ interpretation of 
a contract within corporate law incorporates the economist’s approach to 
 103 Part II outlines how court-imposed fiduciary duties aim to mitigate transactional costs by 
reducing the need to individually contract these duties, thereby allowing for more certainty in 
contract terms and enforcement. 
 104 Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1549 
(1989). 
 105 Id. at 1549-50. 
 106 Id. at 1550. 
 107 Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its Economic 
Character and Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045, 1047 (1991). 
 108 Id. 
 109 Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. at 1549. 
 110 Id. 
 111 Id. 
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a contract while also viewing fiduciary duties as immutable contract 
terms.112 
Initially, there may be some confusion concerning the application of 
the principal-agency problem to discuss the function of fiduciary duties 
as they apply to corporate directors, who are not agents in the proper 
sense.  For purposes of this Article, the word agent is to be read broadly 
to include both corporate officers and directors, both of whom work 
primarily to advance the interests of the principal (shareholders).113  As a 
result, both corporate officers and directors will be referred to 
collectively as “corporate managers.”114 
Normative contractarianism aims to incentivize corporate managers 
to serve the interests of shareholders by structuring their fiduciary duties 
 112 Id. at 1550; see Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An 
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L. J. 87, 88-89 (1989) (describing how fiduciary duties 
are immutable terms that cannot be waived by the contracting parties, which is an attempt by the 
judiciary to reduce transaction costs). 
 113 An often-cited decision on corporate fiduciary duties in Delaware stated as follows: 
“Corporate officers and directors . . . stand in a fiduciary relation to the corporation and its 
stockholders.”  Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939).  See also WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, 
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 837.50 (2003) (“[C]orporate directors and 
officers occupy a fiduciary capacity . . . .”); id. § 991 (“To a great extent, the rules governing 
liability are the same whether the officer sued is a director or some other officer such as the 
president, vice president, secretary . . . .”); see, e.g., Hillary A. Sale, Delaware’s Good Faith, 89 
CORNELL L. REV. 456, 462 n.28 (2004) (The fiduciary duties discussed in this Article apply both to 
directors and officers.).  Executive compensation contracts are negotiated and executed on behalf of 
shareholders by executive committees, such as compensation committees.  While directors 
ultimately ratify these contracts, this Article views directors as agents for purposes of principal-
agency theory since directors are bound by the same fiduciary duties as corporate officers. 
 114 This view is not uncommon and is often used when examining the duties that directors and 
officers owe to the shareholders.  Though common, grouping directors and officers under the same 
umbrella of fiduciary duties has confused and even stumped courts.  Robert Cooter & Bradley J. 
Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship, Its Economic Character & Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1045, 1046 n.2 (1991) (quoting LAC Minerals Ltd. v. Int’l Corona Res. Ltd., [1989] 2 
S.C.R. 574 (Can.)). The court in LAC Minerals stated: 
There are a few legal concepts more frequently invoked but less conceptually certain than 
that of the fiduciary relationship.  In specific circumstances and in specific relationships, 
courts have no difficulty in imposing fiduciary obligations, but at a more fundamental level, 
the principle on which that obligation is based is unclear.  Indeed, the term “fiduciary” has 
been described as “one of the most ill-defined, if not altogether misleading terms in our 
law . . . .” 
LAC Minerals Ltd., 2 S.C.R. 574.  Even Justice Frankfurter referenced the ubiquitous nature of 
fiduciary relationships in S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 85-86 (1943), stating, 
[T]o say that a man is a fiduciary only begins analysis: it gives direction to further inquiry.  
To whom is he a fiduciary?  What obligations does he owe as a fiduciary?  In what respect 
has he failed to discharge these obligations?  And what are the consequences of his deviation 
from duty? 
Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. at 85-86. 
17
George: Disincentive Schemes in Executive Compensation
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2012
366 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42 
 
more appropriately.115  Corporate governance refers to the set of rules 
that codifies the relationship between shareholders and corporate 
managers.116  Strong corporate governance rules increase transparency 
and accountability by minimizing transaction costs and efficiently 
balancing management discretion.117  The strength of these rules 
correlates with greater capital investment and thus market 
development.118  Conversely, weak corporate governance rules lead to 
gross mismanagement, waste, and ultimately capital flight.119 
A.  PRINCIPAL-AGENCY PROBLEM AND AGENCY COSTS 
Though contractual relationships have incorporated fiduciary duties 
for nearly 250 years,120 the purpose of this judge-made doctrine and its 
function within a corporate governance scheme is best understood in 
light of agency costs.  Agency costs, which include shareholder-
monitoring costs, are incurred when the contracting parties attempt to 
curtail the principal-agency problem by limiting their divergent 
interests.121 
Corporate governance scholars famously noted that the central 
problem of corporate governance is rooted in this divergent interest 
between shareholders and corporate managers.122  Shareholders have 
 115 See Lynn A. Stout, On the Proper Motives of Corporate Directors (Or, Why You Don’t 
Want to Invite Homo Economicus to Join Your Board), 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (2003). 
 116 STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 8-12 (2008). 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. 
 119 Id. 
 120 Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship, Its Economic 
Character & Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045, 1045 (1991) (citing Keech v. Sandford, 
25 Eng. Rep. 223 (1726)). 
 121 Eugene Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, in THE ECONOMIC NATURE 
OF THE FIRM, A READER, 200-02 (1980); ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN 
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 123 (1932).  These divergent interests have haunted 
economists and legal theorist for centuries, dating back most notably to Adam Smith’s The Wealth of 
Nations in 1776: 
The directors of [jointstock] companies, however, being the managers, rather of other 
people’s money than of their own, it cannot well be expected that they should watch over it 
with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private co-partnery frequently 
watch over their own. . . . Negligence and profusion, therefore, must always prevail, more or 
less, in the management of the affairs of such a company. 
ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 606-07 
(Pa. State Univ. 2005) (1776), available at www2.hn.psu.edu/faculty/jmanis/adam-smith/Wealth-
Nations.pdf. 
 122 See, e.g., BERLE & MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY at 119-
25. 
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surrendered their right to the corporation by entrusting their assets to 
corporate managers, who shareholders hope will act in their best 
interest.123  Shareholders also pool their money to take advantage of 
economies of scale, and they choose corporate managers based in part on 
the managers’ human capital and existing professional relationships.124 
This interdependent relationship gives rise to the principal-agency 
problem: “the interests of ownership and control are in large measure 
opposed if the interests of the latter grow primarily out of the desire for 
personal monetary gain.”125  This lesson is rooted in the neoclassical 
thought that parties to a contract are utility maximizers.126  While 
shareholders are primarily concerned with maximizing return on 
investment, they risk appropriation and/or arbitrage127 by the corporate 
managers they hire.128  Corporate managers may “slack off,” another 
threat to shareholders’ interest.129  “Slacking off” occurs when an agent 
gains a greater degree of utility by introducing more play than work into 
his or her utility function.130  In essence, the corporate manager is able to 
increase his or her hourly wage or salary by working less.131 
 123 Sheehy, Scrooge—The Reluctant Stakeholder, 14 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. at 211. 
 124 BERLE & MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY at 119-25; 
Michael Jensen & William Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and 
Ownership Structure, in THE ECONOMIC NATURE OF THE FIRM, A READER, 209, 212. (1986).  This 
agency relationship was also famously defined by Jensen and Meckling as “a contract under which 
one or more person (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on 
their behalf which involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent.”  Id. 
 125 Id. at 123. 
 126 Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and 
Ownership Structure, in THE ECONOMIC NATURE OF THE FIRM, A READER, 209, 212 (1986); see 
HAROLD DEMSETZ, THE ECONOMICS OF THE BUSINESS FIRM: SEVEN CRITICAL COMMENTARIES 66-
67 (1995) (noting that some economists bifurcate utility-maximizing behavior from profit-
maximizing behavior, arguing that agency problems arise only when principals maximize profit, not 
utility).  This Article takes a common approach, which is to view profit as an independent variable 
within an actor’s overall utility function. 
 127 The term “arbitrage” refers to the simultaneous purchase and sale of some good or service 
in different markets to profit from unequal prices. 
 128 Id. 
 129 Easterbrook & Fischel, Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. at 
1424. 
 130 See id. 
 131 Id. at 1422. 
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This principal-agency problem gives rise to agency costs.132  
Agency costs are defined as “the sum of: (1) the monitoring expenditures 
by the principal, (2) the bonding expenditures by the agent, [and] (3) the 
residual loss.”133  Monitoring costs are incurred by the shareholder when 
he or she seeks to enforce a corporate manager’s incentive-based 
contract, which was originally designed to limit divergent interests.134  
This form of oversight is used when the marginal benefit achieved 
through reduced shirking exceeds or is equal to the marginal cost of 
monitoring the agent’s aberrant activities.135 
When monitoring becomes too costly or impractical, shareholders 
will bond the corporate manager.136  Bonds are devices, which may 
include attaching the corporate manager’s pay to the corporation’s 
performance, that ensure the shareholder is compensated when the 
corporate manager takes a certain action.137  On the other hand, bonding 
may prevent the agent, through the imposition of penalties, from taking 
actions that might materially impair the shareholder’s interest.138  The 
transactional costs incurred by the shareholder via monitoring and 
bonding reduce the shareholder’s dollar value in the corporation.139  This 
loss is referred to as the “residual loss.”140 
Both “monitoring” and “bonding” are methods of private 
regulation.141  More generally, these methods include the employment 
market: the threat of being fired or penalized with lower wages, or the 
 132 Erica Beecher-Monas, Enron, Epistemology, and Accountability: Regulating in a Global 
Economy, 37 IND. L. REV. 141, 146 (2003).  Harold Demsetz provides an excellent discussion 
regarding the economics of agency costs within a firm.  He states that, because monitoring and 
bonding costs cannot feasibly be eliminated, transaction and information costs are positive.  This 
results from the greater degrees of diffuseness of ownership structure, the severity of the agency 
problem, and the utility function of the principal.  HAROLD DEMSETZ, THE ECONOMICS OF THE 
BUSINESS FIRM: SEVEN CRITICAL COMMENTARIES 23-30 (1995). 
 133 Michael Jensen & William Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency 
Costs, and Ownership Structure, in THE ECONOMIC NATURE OF THE FIRM, A READER, 209, 212 
(1986). 
 134 Id. 
 135 Id. at 212-13. 
 136 Id. 
 137 Id.; see also Easterbrook & Fischel, , Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. 
L. REV. at 1422-25. 
 138 Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and 
Ownership Structure at 212; see also Easterbrook & Fischel, Contractual Freedom in Corporate 
Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. at 1422-25. 
 139 Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and 
Ownership Structure at 213. 
 140 Id. 
 141 Easterbrook & Fischel, Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. at 
1422-25. 
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hope of being rewarded for quality performance.142  These methods also 
include the marketplace, where only well-managed firms will survive.143  
Sophisticated principals may create full-time monitoring contracts, 
known as employment contracts, to ensure that their interests are 
protected.144  Full-time monitoring and bonding mechanisms were found 
by principals to be too costly, and often ineffective because of the lack of 
proper supervision and enforcement.145 
B.  THE ROLE OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES 
An alternative to costly, private monitoring methods is the common-
law doctrine of fiduciary duties.146  Fiduciary duties are public control 
mechanisms initially developed by the judiciary to reduce the cost of 
corporate manager deviance and to maximize shareholder wealth by 
limiting oversight costs.147  Specifically, court-imposed fiduciary duties 
limit the need for monitoring and bonding costs148 because the duties are 
immutable terms in every corporate manager contract.149  This reduces 
agency costs, a subset of transactional costs,150 making the contract more 
efficient.151  The imposition of fiduciary duties in the corporate context 
“is designed for the protection of the entire community of interests in the 
 142 FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 91 (1991). 
 143 Id. 
 144 Id. at 92. 
 145 K.A.D. Camara, Shareholder Voting and the Bundling Problem in Corporate Law, 2004 
WIS. L. REV. 1425 (2004); Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 
COLUM. L. REV. 1549, 1585 (1989). 
 146 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW at 92. 
 147 Easterbrook & Fischel, Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. at 
1431-34. 
 148 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW at 98. 
 149 Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory 
of Default Rules, 99 YALE L. J. 87, 88 (1989) (distinguishing between default terms (e.g., the 
warranty of merchantability) that the parties can contract around, and immutable terms (e.g., 
fiduciary duties) that the parties cannot change by contractual agreement). 
 150 When assessing corporate managers’ fiduciary duties, some scholars have attempted to 
bifurcate transactional costs and agency costs into separate economic fields; however, the approach 
adopted in this Article is that agency costs should be viewed as a subset of transactional costs.  See 
Reza Dibadj, Reconceiving the Firm, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1459, 1469 (2005); William T. Allen, 
Contracts & Communities in Corporation Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1395, 1399-1440 (1993).  
This view is not uncommon; Delaware Chancellor William T. Allen opined that “[t]he transaction 
costs that corporation law can reduce include costs of negotiation and documentation of the 
corporate form, but in the dominant academic vision, most importantly they include other so-called 
agency costs.”  Allen, Contracts & Communities in Corporation Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. at 
1400 (emphasis added). 
 151 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 98 (1991). 
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corporation—creditors as well as shareholders.”152  There are two 
fundamental purposes guiding this doctrine, both of which are 
byproducts of contractarianism.153 
First, assuming information symmetry between the contracting 
parties, perfect fiduciary duties would have been bargained for at 
minimal or no transactional costs.154  Unfortunately, since the corporate 
manager has superior access to inside information and is better 
positioned to amend corporate policy, relaxed rules governing the 
corporate manager’s behavior result.155  A mandatory inclusion of 
fiduciary duty in every corporate manager contract eliminates this 
unequal bargaining power and provides shareholders with the aid of the 
legal system.156  This aid comes in many forms: ex post review of actions 
that turned out poorly,157 imposing both civil and criminal liability as 
effective deterrents, reducing transactional costs through increased 
certainty (analyzing prior case law), and leveraging the courts’ 
comparative advantage in reviewing contract breaches.158 
Moreover, given the prevalence of corporations today, without these 
mandatory rules, a considerable variety of private contracts would arise, 
increasing ambiguity and variance among enforcement efforts.159  
Ultimately, a standardized set of fiduciary duties enhances shareholder 
reliance on residual trust160 and minimizes the threat of opportunism 
among corporate managers, thus, better serving shareholder interests.161 
A second function of this doctrine is the restraint that 
contractarianism imposes upon parties from contracting around corporate 
manager fiduciary duties.162  Courts have made opting out extremely 
difficult and cost-prohibitive, “especially for elements of the duty of 
 152 Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 307 (1939) (footnote omitted). 
 153 Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1549, 
1593-94 (1989); Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic 
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989). 
 154 Id. at 1593; EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 
at 92. 
 155 Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. at 1593. 
 156 Id.; see EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW at 
94-95. 
 157 Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. at 1594; see also 
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW at 99. 
 158 EASTERBROOK &FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW at 98. 
 159 Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. at 1593. 
 160 Claire A. Hill & Erin Ann O’Hara, A Cognitive Theory of Trust, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 
1717, 1759-62 (2006). 
 161 Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. at 1593-94. 
 162 Id. 
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loyalty.”163  Establishing fiduciary duties as immutable terms provides 
more information and assurance to the shareholder today by reducing 
uncertainty in the future.164  This hypothetical approach does not assure 
that the parties will receive their share of the gain, but rather maximizes 
the interest of all parties in the aggregate.  Contractarians argue that, 
under this approach, parties will choose the ex post wealth maximizing 
rule that will most benefit the shareholder in the long run.165  This 
approach also assumes that the contracting parties have the ability to 
diversify their risk.166 
Though a number of arguments have outlined the various purposes 
and benefits of fiduciary duties, many have simply stated that the duty 
exists solely to maximize shareholder value.167  This view, rooted in 
contractarianism, seeks to make contracts between shareholders and 
corporate managers more efficient by reducing transactional costs.168  To 
best reduce these costs and thus make the parties more willing to 
contract, the divergent interests between shareholders and corporate 
managers must be reconciled to the greatest extent possible.169  Courts 
created fiduciary duties to mollify these inherently imperfect 
relationships,170 and to assure shareholders that their interests will be 
 163 Id.; see also Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An 
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 126 (1989) (noting that contracting out of 
immutable terms (such as fiduciary duties) is so cost-prohibitive, given the ex post imposed 
penalties, that contracting parties find these judge-made gap fillers more efficient in comparison).  
There has been a recent attempt by the Delaware Chancery Court to allow even those immutable 
terms, like fiduciary duties, to be modified by contract.  See Amirsaleh v. Bd. of Trade of the City of 
N.Y., Inc., 27 A.3d 522 (Del. 2011) (reversing court of chancery decision).  For a brief discussion of 
the advantages and disadvantages into the effects of Amirsaleh, see J. Robert Brown, What if 
Contract Replaced Fiduciary Duties? A Lesson from Amirsaleh v. Board of Trade of the City of 
New York, THERACETOTHEBOTTOM.ORG (Nov. 24, 2008), 
www.theracetothebottom.org/preemption-of-delaware-law/what-if-contract-replaced-fiduciary-
duties-a-lesson-from-ami.html.  This function finds authority in the Kaldor-Hicks rule, which 
attempts ex ante to maximize benefit to shareholders ex post.  Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of 
Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. at 1594. 
 164 Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. at 1593. 
 165 Id. 
 166 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW at 119-21. 
 167 See id. at 93 (“Detailed contracting, costly enough at the outset of a venture, is almost 
impossible once a firm has been established.  After the firm has raised necessary capital, investors 
have no practical way of revising the articles on their own to overcome intervening legal surprises.  
To use the fiduciary principle for any purpose other than maximizing the welfare of investors 
subverts its function by turning the high costs of direct monitoring—the reasons fiduciary principles 
are needed—into a shield that prevents investors from controlling manager’s conduct.”). 
 168 William T. Allen, Contracts & Communities in Corporation Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 1395, 1399 (1993). 
 169 ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
PROPERTY 123 (1932). 
 170 Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. at 1593. 
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protected and prioritized.171  The result is that contracting costs are 
reduced and information is more freely exchanged between the parties. 
Although the courts’ goal in mandating fiduciary duties, including 
the duty of loyalty and care, is to protect shareholders, the courts have 
actually incentivized corporate managers to breach their duty of loyalty.  
This is because the penalty for breaching one’s duty of loyalty is 
generally the mere disgorgement of ill-gotten gains. 
III.  GAME-THEORETIC APPROACH TO THE DUTY OF LOYALTY 
Given the evolution of fiduciary duties, courts have found that 
management owes both a duty of care and a duty of loyalty to all 
shareholders.  Courts will find a violation of the duty of care when 
management consciously disregards the financial ramifications of its 
decisions, or when it fails to obtain a rudimentary understanding of the 
business.172  The chief remedy in such cases is to award compensatory 
(actual) damages to the shareholders.173  The duty of loyalty, on the other 
hand, addresses issues of conflict, where courts require corporate 
managers to place the corporation’s interest ahead of their own.174  This 
is often referred to as the doctrine of fairness and is imposed primarily by 
social norms.175  The courts more closely scrutinize the duty of loyalty, 
as compared to the duty of care, because the business-judgment rule is 
not a valid defense as it is in a duty-of-care violation.176  The primary 
remedy when there has been a violation of the duty of loyalty is 
disgorgement.177  Disgorgement alone, however, is an insufficient 
 171 Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship, Its Economic 
Character & Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045, 1047 (1991). 
 172 Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 821-22 (N.J. 1981) (describing manager’s 
duty of care to corporation); EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE 
LAW at 103. 
 173 Francis, 432 A.2d at 826 (in discussing the elements for a duty of care violation, the court 
states that “the plaintiff has the burden of establishing the amount of the loss or damages caused by 
the negligence of the [offending officer]. Thus, the plaintiff must establish not only a breach of duty, 
‘but in addition that the performance by the director of his duty would have avoided loss, and the 
amount of the resulting loss.’”) (citations omitted). 
 174 Casey v. Woodruff, 49 N.Y.S.2d 625, 642-43 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1944). 
 175 K.A.D. Camara, Shareholder Voting and the Bundling Problem in Corporate Law, 2004 
WIS. L. REV. 1425, 1436 (2004). 
 176 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW at 103; 
Camara, Shareholder Voting and the Bundling Problem in Corporate Law, 2004 WIS. L. REV. at 
1436 (explaining that courts “impose [a] stiffer standard [here] because there is less reason to trust 
that directors are exercising their business judgment to the benefit of the corporation when they have 
interests on both sides of a transaction”). 
 177 Deborah A. DeMott, Causation in the Fiduciary Realm, 91 B.U. L. REV. 851, 852 (2011) 
(“when a fiduciary breaches the duty of loyalty, a distinctive remedy is available to the beneficiary—
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remedy, as it is unlikely to deter managers from violating their duty of 
loyalty. 
A.  DUTY OF LOYALTY 
Like all contractual obligations that form the corporation, the duty 
of loyalty is born out of an agreement and consent.178  The duty of 
loyalty incorporates elements of fairness and discourages corporate 
managers from entering into transactions that are unfavorable to the 
firm.179  Unlike the duty of care, which is a default term that can be 
manipulated by contract, the duty of loyalty is non-waivable and thus 
inherent in every corporate arrangement.180  Courts have found that 
willful misappropriation of a firm’s assets is akin to stealing property, 
which violates fundamental concepts of fairness.181 
There are two categorical violations of the duty of loyalty.182  The 
first is referred to as self-dealing and involves a corporate manager 
appropriating the firm’s capital without the shareholders’ knowledge or 
informed consent.183  To avoid liability on a claim of breach of duty of 
loyalty, the fiduciary—generally a corporate manager—must prove both 
that the principal would have consented to the transaction and that no 
malfeasance was committed.184 
The second category involves a scenario in which the corporate 
manager may seek the consent of the shareholder but intentionally omits 
material facts, thereby stealing profits or opportunities that belong to the 
firm.185  This is often referred to as usurping a corporate opportunity; a 
corporate manager cannot divert to himself or herself an opportunity 
directed to the corporation.186  Though a fiduciary is often burdened with 
proving the fairness of a transaction if he or she is accused of violating 
disgorgement of the benefit that the fiduciary obtained through the breach.”) (citing Restatement 
(Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment § 43(1) (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005)). 
 178 Richard Epstein, Contract and Trust in Corporate Law: The Case of Corporate 
Opportunity, 21 DEL. J. CORP. L. 5, 13 (1996). 
 179 Lynn A. Stout, On the Proper Motives of Corporate Directors (Or, Why You Don’t Want 
to Invite Homo Economicus to Join Your Board), 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 5 (2003). 
 180 Epstein, Contract and Trust in Corporate Law: The Case of Corporate Opportunity, 21 
DEL. J. CORP. L. at 13. 
 181 See id. 
 182 Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship, Its Economic 
Character & Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045, 1054 (1991). 
 183 Id. 
 184 Id. 
 185 Id. at 1055. 
 186 Broz v. Cellular Info. Sys., Inc, 673 A.2d 148, 154-55 (Del. 1996). 
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the duty of loyalty, the opportunity doctrine places the initial burden on 
the shareholder to prove that the agent usurped an opportunity.187 
Since the common remedy for a violation of the duty of loyalty is 
disgorgement, the corporate manager must pay back to the corporation 
the fair market value of the profits stolen or the opportunities diverted.188  
Though disgorgement is used to deter wrongful conduct by forcing the 
manager to repay ill-gotten profits,189 this remedy fails to provide a 
sufficient disincentive for managers to violate their duty.190  This is 
because mere repayment is an inconsequential concern, absent any other 
punitive consequences, when weighed against the immense financial 
gains a corporate manager may net if his or her wrongful conduct is not 
discovered.  Economic game theory is a useful tool in demonstrating this 
dilemma facing shareholders as they seek to fortify their interests. 
B.  LESSON FROM GAME THEORY APPLIED TO THE DUTY OF LOYALTY 
Game theory, rooted in neoclassical economic theory, is based on 
the assumption that all players are utility maximizers.191  In light of other 
rational-based economic tools, like Bayesian probability,192 legal 
 187 In Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939), the court famously laid out the factors that 
must be weighed jointly when determining whether a corporate opportunity was usurped by a 
corporate manager: 
[I]f there is presented to a corporate officer or director a business opportunity which the 
corporation is financially able to undertake, is, from its nature, in the line of the corporation’s 
business and is of practical advantage to it, is one in which the corporation has an interest or 
a reasonable expectancy, and, by embracing the opportunity, the self-interest of the officer or 
director will be brought into conflict with that of his corporation, the law will not permit him 
to seize the opportunity for himself. 
Guth, 5 A.2d at 511. 
 188 Lynn A. Stout, On the Proper Motives of Corporate Directors (Or, Why You Don’t Want 
to Invite Homo Economicus to Join Your Board), 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 5-6 (2003). 
 189 See S.E.C. v. Commonwealth Chem. Sec., Inc., 574 F.2d 90, 102 (2d Cir. 1978) (“Unlike 
damages, [disgorgement] is a method of forcing a defendant to give up the amount by which he was 
unjustly enriched.”). 
 190 Stout, On the Proper Motives of Corporate Directors (Or, Why You Don’t Want to Invite 
Homo Economicus to Join Your Board), 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. at 5-6 (observing that disgorgement is 
“not the kind of threat to strike terror into a larcenous heart”). 
 191 Harvey Leibenstein, The Prisoners’ Dilemma in the Invisible Hand: An Analysis of 
Intrafirm Productivity, in THE ECONOMIC NATURE OF THE FIRM, A READER, 170 (1980). 
 192 Bayesian analysis is “controversial,” restricting players’ equilibrium beliefs as merely 
responsive behavior (only after they witness how a previous player behaved), whereas game theory 
provides a better analysis of the law, incorporating out-of-equilibrium or external decisions as forms 
of “passive conjectures.”  Ian Ayres, Three Approaches to Modeling Corporate Games: Some 
Observations, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 419, 420-21 (1991) (“Game theory shows that a wide variety of 
diverse behavior can fly under the banner of rational decision-making when there is incomplete or 
imperfect information.”). 
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theorists have long favored game-theoretic models.193  Game theory 
allows legal theorists to model scenarios in which asymmetric and 
incomplete information is possessed by shareholders and corporate 
managers.194 
Game theory, despite the payoff matrices, “game trees” and arcane 
mathematics, is simply a normative tool that examines how rational 
players would maximize their utility in the face of “conflict, competition, 
collusion and cooperation.”195  There are numerous independent 
variables in the theory of games, including the number of players, 
probability and magnitude of outcome, external and internal influences, 
and even elements of fairness, equity and property rights.196  In the 
corporate context, this applies to how shareholders and corporate 
managers can best achieve equilibrium that maximizes their respective 
utilities.197  Since both kinds of parties are presumably rational utility-
maximizing players, game theory may be used to test whether the duty of 
loyalty achieves its primary goal of protecting shareholders. 
Game theory brings to light two patent deficiencies resulting from 
the strict application of the duty of loyalty.  First, there is no punitive 
consequence to a manager who steals profits or usurps a corporate 
opportunity.198  Second, the primary remedy for a duty of loyalty 
violation is disgorgement—not a punishment per se.  Nevertheless, 
disgorgement remains the remedy favored by the SEC and state 
governments when regulating the breach of a corporate manager’s duty 
of loyalty.199 
1.  Why Punishment Is Important to Effectively Deter Violations 
To adequately deter a manager from violating his or her fiduciary 
duty, the cost of violation should be greater than the potential gain from 
 193 Ayres, Three Approaches to Modeling Corporate Games: Some Observations, 60 U. CIN. 
L. REV. at 420-21. 
 194 Id. at 422. 
 195 Martin Shubik, Game Theory, Law, and the Concept of Competition, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 
285, 286, 300 (1991). 
 196 Id. 
 197 Id. at 301; Easterbrook & Fischel, Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. 
REV. at 1435 (“The ‘game’ of corporate governance is most assuredly a repeat game in which people 
learn from experience.”). 
 198 Lynn A. Stout, On the Proper Motives of Corporate Directors (Or, Why You Don’t Want 
to Invite Homo Economicus to Join Your Board), 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 5-7 (2003). 
 199 Elaine Buckberg & Frederick C. Dunbar, Disgorgement: Punitive Demands and Remedial 
Offers, 63 BUS. LAW. 347 (2008). 
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the wrongdoing.200  The following two figures illustrate how court-
imposed penalties would be effective in protecting shareholder welfare 
and limiting manager appropriation. 
Figure 1 depicts the potential gains and losses in a scenario in which 
no penalty is imposed upon a corporate manager who misappropriates a 
shareholder’s investments.201  As in all corporate scenarios, a 
shareholder, the first player to move, must decide whether to make an 
investment of 1 unit.  If he or she decides not to invest, then there is 
nothing for the manager to respond to, and the game concludes. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1—No Penalty Imposed 
  
Corporate Manager (Agent) 
   Cooperate Misappropriate 
0.5 2 Invest 
0.5 -1 
0 0 
Shareholder 
(Principal) 
Don’t Invest 
0 0 
 
If, on the other hand, the shareholder does decide to invest 1 unit, the 
corporate manager has the opportunity to cooperate or misappropriate.  
Cooperation produces a total payoff (gain) of 1, which is then equally 
divided between the players, hence the 0.5 gain for each player in the 
northwest quadrant (the shareholder, of course, also retains the right to 
his or her original investment of 1 unit).  Here, the principal-agency 
problem is not present and both players have increased their welfare.  
Alternatively, if the corporate manager decides to misappropriate (steal) 
the shareholder’s investment, the shareholder will lose his initial 
investment of 1, whereas the corporate manager will gain the initial 1 
unit he stole, plus the 1 unit of gain earned by the investment,202 as 
illustrated in the northeast quadrant. 
 
 200 Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship, Its Economic 
Character & Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045, 1052 (1991). 
 201 ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 203-07 (5th ed. 2007). 
 202 For ease of illustration, these scenarios assume that an initial investment of 1 unit will 
generate 1 unit of gain. 
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In this scenario, if the shareholder, the first to make a move, decides 
to invest, the most profitable response for the corporate manager would 
be to misappropriate.  Given that the shareholder is likely to anticipate 
misappropriation, particularly if there is no disincentive for the corporate 
manager to do otherwise, the shareholder’s best move is not to invest. 
To respond to this gridlock, courts should impose adequate penalties 
on corporate manager misappropriation.  The aim would be to protect 
shareholders while providing them an incentive to invest.  Figure 2 
depicts such a scenario, where damages that exceed the gain from 
wrongdoing are imposed. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2—Penalty Imposed 
  
Corporate Manager (Agent) 
   Cooperate Misappropriate 
0.5 -1 Invest 
0.5 1 
0 0 
Shareholder 
(Principal) 
Don’t Invest 
0 0 
  
In Figure 2, if the shareholder decides to invest 1 unit and the 
manager cooperates, then both will receive a 0.5 gain from the 
transaction.  If, on the other hand, the manager is found liable for 
misappropriation of shareholder investments, a court will impose a 
penalty upon the corporate manager.  Here, for example, the corporate 
manager is required to disgorge the initial investment of 1 back to the 
shareholder, as well as deliver an additional 1.0 penalty to the 
shareholder, which would have been the recovered investment for both 
the shareholder and the manager had the corporate manager cooperated.  
Thus, the corporate manager is penalized a unit of 1, as opposed to 
profiting 2 units in the previous scenario when no penalties were 
imposed.  Under this scenario, the corporate manager has an incentive to 
cooperate and therefore not violate the duty of loyalty to the investing 
shareholder.  As a result, both shareholders and corporate managers gain 
from the transaction.  These figures simply illustrate that to effectively 
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sanction and disincentive corporate managers, damages must equal or 
exceed the benefit of wrongdoing. 
2.  Disgorgement Alone Is Not Enough to Protect Shareholders 
To better understand these Figures and the role of disgorgement, a 
simple algebraic equation may be utilized.  The expected sanction 
associated with violating a duty of loyalty “equals the probability that a 
sanction will be imposed multiplied by its magnitude.”203  This may be 
written mathematically as E(S) = P*M, where E(S) is the expected 
sanction the corporate manager must pay, P is the probability of holding 
the manager liable,204 and M represents the ratio between the sanction 
and perfect disgorgement; disgorgement is “perfect” when the sanction 
imposed is equal to the ill-gotten gains (M = 1).205  When M < 1, the 
sanction is less than perfect disgorgement.  When M > 1, this does not 
mean that the probability of discovering a breaching corporate manager 
is greater than a 100%, but rather indicates a “punishment,” something 
greater than simply disgorging stolen profits.206 
Current corporate governance schemes only require perfect 
disgorgement (M = 1) when a manager violates his or her duty of loyalty.  
The manager is expected only to disgorge those profits or opportunities 
stolen from shareholders.  When disgorgement is perfect (M = 1), the 
manager is indifferent between cooperating or misappropriating profits 
or business opportunities because when the breaching manager is 
discovered he must disgorge only the unit gained, but is otherwise no 
worse off than if he or she had not misappropriated.207 
This equation demonstrates that only two scenarios adequately 
protect shareholders’ interests: M > 1 (Scenario 1); or P = 1 (Scenario 2).  
Scenario 1, where a corporate manager is penalized some amount greater 
than perfect disgorgement, is the most effective way to deter manager 
disloyalty as illustrated in Figure 2 above.  Scenario 2, where the 
corporate manager is found liable 100% of the time (P = 1), is an 
 203 See Cooter & Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship, Its Economic Character & Legal 
Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. at 1052. 
 204 While “P”—the probability that the manager will be held liable—dramatically impacts 
court-imposed sanctions, this equation serves to show how the role of disgorgement alone is 
insufficient at deterring corporate managers from violating their duty of loyalty. 
 205 See Cooter & Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship, Its Economic Character & Legal 
Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. at 1052. 
 206 Id. at 1052-53. 
 207 COOTER & ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 257-58 (5th ed. 2007).  As a tangential note, 
President Truman is alleged to have joked (complained) that he could never find a one-handed 
economist. 
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idealistic approach, existing only if there is perfect symmetry and all 
information is openly communicated. 
Unfortunately, only one scenario exists today: the probability that a 
disloyal manager will be liable is something less than 100% while 
perfect disgorgement is the only remedy available under the law.  This is 
due to the principal-agency problem, where imperfect and asymmetric 
information is possessed by the principal and agent.208  Accordingly, P < 
1 and M = 1 means (P*M) < 1, which equates to E(S) < 1.  To be 
effective, the expected sanction imposed upon a disloyal manager must 
exceed the gain from his or her wrongdoing.209  Thus, under the current 
state of the law, sanctions are generally inadequate to prevent managers 
from breaching their duty of loyalty and fail to protect shareholder 
welfare. 
In sum, game theory illustrates that current corporate governance 
schemes fail to protect innocent shareholders from disloyal managers.  
Given the lethargic pace of the judiciary, and Congress’s failed attempts 
at seeking corporate governance reform, specifically in the area of 
executive compensation,210 the best arena to protect shareholder interest 
is the private contract market.  Here, shareholders will be able to 
construct specially designed employment contracts in an attempt to make 
M > 1. 
IV.  CONSTRUCTING AN EFFICIENT CORPORATE MANAGER 
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT 
In light of the recent financial crisis, the divergent interests of 
shareholders and corporate managers have resurged in corporate 
governance.211  As legislatures seek to protect shareholder interests while 
reining in manager deviance, fierce debate exists over how best to 
accomplish these goals.212  Judge Frank H. Easterbrook has observed that 
“the trick in constructing a corporate governance structure is to align the 
 208 Cooter & Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship, Its Economic Character & Legal 
Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. at 1052. 
 209 Id. 
 210 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (addressing executive compensation only through disclosure amendments). 
 211 Steven H. Kropp, Corporate Governance, Executive Compensation, Corporate 
Performance, and Worker Rights in Bankruptcy: Some Lessons from Game Theory, 57 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 1, 10 (2007). 
 212 Carl C. Icahn, The Economy Needs Corporate Governance Reform, WALL ST. J., Jan. 23, 
2009, at A13; see J.C. Boggs et al., Dodd-Frank at One Year: Growing Pains, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 
ONLINE 52 (2011), available at www.hblr.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/Boggs-Foxman-Nahill-
Growing-Pains.pdf (providing a brief analysis of the Democratic and Republican arguments for and 
against the Dodd-Frank Act). 
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interest of the agents with those of the investors, not to pretend that self-
interest is a pestiferous thing to be conquered.”213 
Unfortunately, many corporate governance mechanisms have fallen 
short of their intended purpose of minimizing transaction costs and 
protecting shareholder interests.214  Many of the problems associated 
with mitigating the principal-agency problem are rooted in the 
development of corporate contracts.215  For example, questions arise as 
to whether a complex contract protecting shareholders can be written, 
and whether it can be done feasibly and without prohibitively high 
transactional costs.216 
Given the difficulty of developing an effective corporate 
governance scheme, it is surprising that there is little discussion on 
Capitol Hill about reforming the duty of loyalty.  The reason, perhaps, is 
because the duty of loyalty is an immutable term that finds its 
justification outside the legal system.217  For instance, scholars state that 
the operation of the social norm of loyalty and fairness acts as a sanction 
against managers who fail to cooperate.218  In other words, scholars have 
argued that M is in fact larger than 1 given internal pressures, 
“including . . . a [manager’s] sense of honor; her feelings of 
responsibility; her sense of obligation to the firm and its shareholders; 
and, her desire to do the right thing.”219 
However, as an immutable term, “[t]he duty of loyalty is . . . 
imposed . . . [by law but] seldom, if ever, imposed by a real contract.”220  
 213 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW at 1429-31. 
 214 Reza Dibadj, Reconceiving the Firm, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1459, 1477 (2005) (“The three 
most important mechanisms to minimize agency costs—managerial incentives, the board of 
directors, and the market for corporate control—have proven themselves to be embarrassingly weak 
constraints in their implementation.”). 
 215 Oliver Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual 
Relations, in THE ECONOMIC NATURE OF THE FIRM, A READER, 142 (1980). 
 216 Id. 
 217 Lynn A. Stout, On the Proper Motives of Corporate Directors (Or, Why You Don’t Want 
to Invite Homo Economicus to Join Your Board), 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 7-8 (2003). 
 218 See id. (citing various scholars who look to this social norm and fairness doctrine); Dibadj, 
Reconceiving the Firm, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. at 1477-78 (examining fairness and social norm as 
authoritative); Sheehy, Scrooge—The Reluctant Stakeholder, 14 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. at 214; 
K.A.D. Camara, Shareholder Voting and the Bundling Problem in Corporate Law, 2004 WIS. L. 
REV. 1425, 1444-45 (2004) (“Common sense teaches that norms of responsible conduct and 
internalized ideas of right and wrong combined with preferences, as opposed to incentives, for doing 
right are important bulwarks against deviant conduct.”). 
 219 Stout, On the Proper Motives of Corporate Directors (Or, Why You Don’t Want to Invite 
Homo Economicus to Join Your Board), 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. at 8-9 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 220 Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1253, 1274 
(1999); Easterbrook & Fischel, Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. at 1436 
(“[M]anagers . . . may not contract out of the ‘duty of loyalty.’”). 
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As a result, scholars propose that if courts increase the impact of these 
social norms, thereby increasing sanctions, this will better protect 
shareholder interests since managers will internalize the higher cost 
associated with violating these norms.221  This utopian view is rooted in 
the belief that “trust plays an essential role” in corporate contracting, and 
that any attempt to include the duty of loyalty into a real contract 
undermines the very purpose upon which this duty is based: fairness and 
social norms.222 
These “trust” scholars agree, however, that current legal sanctions 
against disloyal managers are insufficient to deter manager deviance.223  
Yet, they vehemently argue that the social norm of loyalty “adds the 
sanction of loss of reputation to the legal sanctions,” which in turn 
strengthens and thus confirms the duty of loyalty as a valid deterrent.224  
Without these social norms, monitoring costs would escalate, resulting in 
prohibitively high transaction costs.225 
Unfortunately, there are two major shortfalls to this belief.  First, 
adopting such a romantic view of corporate law undoubtedly limits the 
legal and mathematical analysis of the duty of loyalty.226  This in turn 
restricts scholars’ ability to examine and strengthen this area of law to 
better protect shareholder welfare.  Second, these “trust” scholars fail to 
note that managers of large, publicly traded corporations operate within a 
tightly knit social circle, almost entirely immune from allegations voiced 
 221 Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV. at 1274.  Most recently, 
the United States Attorney’s Office in Manhattan successfully prosecuted Raj Rajaratnam, former 
head of the Galleon Group hedge fund, of insider trading, where he was sentenced to eleven years in 
prison and ordered to pay $10 million in fines and forfeit $54.8 million.  In response to questions 
about Mr. Rajaratnam’s sentencing, U.S. Attorney Preet S. Bharara noted that the deterrent effect of 
harsh insider-trading sentences is designed to “convince rational business people that the risk is not 
worth it.”  Ultimately, Mr. Bharara pointed to the importance of increasing sanctions on agents—
those who oversee others’ assets.  Peter Lattman, Rajaratnam Gets 11 Years in Prison for Insider 
Trading, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2011, available at http://articles.boston.com/2011-10-
14/business/30280284_1_galleon-group-raj-rajaratnam-zvi-goffer. 
 222 See Bruce Chapman, Trust, Economic Rationality, and the Corporate Fiduciary 
Obligation, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 547, 549 (1993). 
 223 Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV. at 1276; Stout, On the 
Proper Motives of Corporate Directors (Or, Why You Don’t Want to Invite Homo Economicus to 
Join Your Board), 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. at 7-8. 
 224 Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV. at 1276. 
 225 Id. 
 226 K.A.D. Camara, Shareholder Voting and the Bundling Problem in Corporate Law, 2004 
WIS. L. REV. 1425, 1445 (2004) (stating that legal scholars must rely primarily upon psychologists 
to provide answers or in-depth analysis of the actions taken by corporate managers). 
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by angry shareholders and news outlets.227  As a result, the social norm 
of loyalty is diminished and rendered ineffective as a useful sanction.228 
Though Congress is not looking directly to the duty of loyalty as a 
tool for achieving corporate governance reform, it has been examining in 
great detail executive compensation packages.229  These pay packages, 
acting as effective monitoring systems, implicate the duty of loyalty230 
and may be used by shareholders to mitigate the principal-agency 
problem.231  However, the benefit of these packages must be weighed 
against the higher transactional costs of contracting, monitoring, and 
bonding.232  Though they present an opportunity to rein in manager 
disloyalty, executive compensation contracts inevitably incorporate lax 
fiduciary standards since they are immunized from duty-of-loyalty 
reviews.233  Accordingly, corporate managers face little or no 
punishment for poor performance while the shareholders bear 234
In an attempt to balance these divergent interests in light of game 
theory, Congress and/or shareholders should seek to punish (M > 1) 
executives who act disloyally, rather than offer purely incentive-based 
contracts.  This Article is not intended to fully develop all material terms 
of an executive compensation contract for purposes of successfully 
reining in manager deviance; rather, it will explore problems with the 
 227 Stout, On the Proper Motives of Corporate Directors (Or, Why You Don’t Want to Invite 
Homo Economicus to Join Your Board), 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. at 7-8. 
 228 Id. 
 229 Paul Curran Kingsbery, Stakeholder Inclusion and Shareholder Protection: New 
Governance and the Changing Landscape of American Securities Regulation, 36 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 913, 923 (2009); see Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Paying for Long-Term Performance, 
158 U. PA. L. REV. 1915 (2010); Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Holger Spamann, The Wages 
of Failure: Executive Compensation at Bear Stearns & Lehman 2000-2008, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 257, 
258 (2010). 
 230 Steven H. Kropp, Corporate Governance, Executive Compensation, Corporate 
Performance, and Worker Rights in Bankruptcy: Some Lessons from Game Theory, 57 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 1, 35 (2007). 
 231 Eugene Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, in THE ECONOMIC NATURE 
OF THE FIRM, A READER, 203 (1980). 
 232 Michael Jensen & William Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency 
Costs, and Ownership Structure, in THE ECONOMIC NATURE OF THE FIRM, A READER, 209, 212 
(1986). 
 233 Steven H. Kropp, Corporate Governance, Executive Compensation, Corporate 
Performance, and Worker Rights in Bankruptcy: Some Lessons from Game Theory, 57 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 1, 36 (2007).  The Model Business Corporation Act section 8.25 (1998) states that an 
independent board reviews executives’ pay packages, which may be advised by an expert consultant 
per Delaware Code Annotated Title 8, section 141(e).  MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.25 (1998).  
Given the traditional practice associated with these independent reviews, compensation packages are 
not subject to duty-of-loyalty reviews; instead, they are subject only to duty-of-care reviews under 
the Act.  Id. § 8.62.  This is yet another reason why this Article has focused solely on the duty of 
loyalty—since this fiduciary duty is too often overlooked. 
 234 Id. at 23. 
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status quo and present potential contract terms that might help to increase 
M over 1. 
A.  PROBLEMS WITH CURRENT EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION SCHEMES 
The current state of executive compensation schemes is under 
assault as Congress and scholars seek to discover a panacea for this 
corporate ill.235  For example, H.R. 1664 proposes to prohibit pay plans 
that are “unreasonable or excessive, as defined in standards established 
by the Secretary [of the Treasury]” or a bonus “not directly based on 
performance-based measures set forth in standards established by the 
Secretary [of the Treasury].”236  The problem with this proposal is that it 
is rooted in the myopic view adopted by Congress that bonuses should 
rest entirely on performance-based measures.237 
Over the years, executive pay plans have sought to strengthen the 
relationship between performance and pay.  Traditionally, scholars 
argued that corporate managers were “overinvested” in the corporation 
because the manager’s wealth and human capital were tied to that 
firm.238  To prevent risk aversion due to this overinvestment, 
compensation agreements began including risk-incentive components 
(e.g., stock options), to protect managers from downside exposure while 
rewarding them for riskier ventures.239  However, in light of the recent 
 235 Paul Current Kingsbery, Stakeholder Inclusion and Shareholder Protection: New 
Governance And The Changing Landscape of American Securities Regulation, 36 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 913, 923 (2009); see Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Paying for Long-Term Performance, 
158 U. PA. L. REV. 1915 (2010); see Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Holger Spamann, The 
Wages of Failure: Executive Compensation at Bear Sterns & Lehman 2000-2008, 27 YALE J. ON 
REG. 257, 258–59 (2010). 
 236 Grayson-Himes Pay for Performance Act of 2009, H.R. 1664, 111th Cong., 1st Sess. § 
1(e)(1)(A)-(B) (2009). 
 237 This view was promulgated during the 1980’s and 1990’s when economists and legal 
theorists sought to restore shareholder confidence by establishing a strong link between pay and 
performance.  See JOHN MCMILLAN, GAMES, STRATEGIES AND MANAGERS 123 (1992).  For 
example, Harold Demsetz noted: “[E]xecutive compensation systems in large corporations (today) 
seem weak in their relationship to firm performance.  They seem poorly designed even when one of 
the objectives is to link compensation to performance.”  HAROLD DEMSETZ, THE ECONOMICS OF THE 
BUSINESS FIRM: SEVEN CRITICAL COMMENTARIES 65-66 (1995).  Statistics during this period 
showed that the marginal rate of payment between firm performance and manager pay was 0.002%.  
JOHN MCMILLAN, GAMES, STRATEGIES AND MANAGERS at 123.  So, a corporate manager’s direct 
pay would increase two cents when the market value of the company increased by $1,000.  Id.  With 
respect to stock options, statistics showed the marginal rate of payment was 0.325%.  So, for every 
$1,000 increase in the stock-market value of the corporation, a manager’s remuneration would 
increase $3.25.  Id. at 124.  These relationships were extremely tenuous at best, proving that 
executive incentives were not strong enough.  Id. at 124-25. 
 238 K.A.D. Camara, Shareholder Voting and the Bundling Problem in Corporate Law, 2004 
WIS. L. REV. 1425, 1443 (2004). 
 239 Id. 
35
George: Disincentive Schemes in Executive Compensation
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2012
384 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42 
rests.  
 
financial meltdown, positive incentive-based systems alone, without help 
from a disincentive counterpart, have failed to successfully rein in 
manager deviance and protect shareholders’ inte 240
These risk-incentive terms have caused more harm than good, as 
firms took on excessively high levels of risk due in part to downward 
risk protection contracted to corporate managers.241  Ultimately, a strictly 
positive incentive-based scheme, or a “direct incentive scheme,” without 
a punishment mechanism, incentivizes managers to take on risky 
ventures without internalizing that risk, thus failing to protect 
shareholders.242  In direct incentive schemes, “[d]irectors are always 
better off stealing from the corporation . . . than not stealing because they 
enjoy fully what they steal but only a fraction (the incentive payment for 
not stealing over the value of the item in question) of what they leave 
alone.”243  Hence there is a need to supplement this positive incentive 
scheme with a disincentive, or punishment scheme. 
B.  INCLUDING “PUNISHMENT” TERMS (M > 1) IN EXECUTIVE 
COMPENSATION SCHEMES 
Corporate governance contract terms are often negotiated between 
executive committees, acting on behalf of shareholders, and corporate 
managers, whereas the duty of loyalty is nonnegotiable.  Though this 
term is imputed in contracts to reduce transactional costs, shareholders 
are fully able to include terms that “disincentivize” or punish managers 
who act disloyally.  There are a number of methods and broad terms that 
could be included in executive compensation contracts to supplement 
direct incentive terms in a way that would better protect shareholders. 
1.  The Free Market 
The first method relies upon a neoclassical economics approach: the 
open market rather than the judiciary.  The free flow of information, not 
only between contracting parties, but also within the market that 
facilitates these corporate contracts, is critical in developing effective 
compensation plans.244  Since corporate governance issues are 
 240 See Bebchuk, Cohen & Spamann, The Wages of Failure: Executive Compensation at Bear 
Sterns & Lehman 2000-2008, 27 YALE J. ON REG. at 258-59. 
 241 See id. 
 242 Camara, Shareholder Voting and the Bundling Problem in Corporate Law, 2004 WIS. L. 
REV. at 1443. 
 243 Id. 
 244 JOHN MCMILLAN, GAMES, STRATEGIES AND MANAGERS 127 (1992); EASTERBROOK & 
FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 319 (1991) (“Though information is the 
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2.  Net-Harm Function 
 method 
enco
that this disloyalty will be discovered and successfully prosecuted: the 
 
contractual in nature, contractarianism teaches us that punishment terms 
will be fully priced into the transaction between managers and 
shareholders.245  Though this would otherwise increase agency costs 
through increased monitoring and bonding efforts to enforce these terms, 
“the cost of crafting alternatives to the standard-form contracts in the 
nexus-contracts will be borne only when the perceived benefits exceed 
the drafting costs.”246 
As shareholders increasingly demand punishment terms in 
executive compensation, the markets—not the negotiating parties—will 
efficiently price these terms.247  However, poorly drafted terms will lead 
to disloyal management, and overly restrictive terms might cause the best 
corporate managers to take their talents elsewhere, as well as deter 
prudent investors.  By contrast, well-drafted terms will emerge in the 
market place, respond to changes accordingly, and effectively attract 
preeminent talent.248  To develop an effective contract to disincentivize 
managers from violating their duty of loyalty, shareholders must be 
willing to pay relevant costs in advance, since these terms are 
preemptory.249  As Stephen Bainbridge poignantly stated, “The 
predictive power of any model of the corporation must be measured by 
the model’s ability to predict the separation of ownershi
250
A more viable method is to include damages in the executive 
compensation plan as a function of the harm caused by the manager’s 
disloyal acts.  The aim is to provide comprehensive incentives to 
managers while also compelling them to pay damages.  This
urages managers to cooperate and not violate their duty.251 
To mitigate costs and maximize shareholder benefit, the optimal 
punishment is the harm of the disloyal acts, divided by the probability 
basis of all contracts, many contracts are enforced best through self-help remedies rather than actions 
at law.”). 
 245 Easterbrook & Fischel, Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. at 
1430. 
 246 ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 322-23 (5th ed. 2007). 
 247 Easterbrook & Fischel, Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. at 
1430. 
 248 Id. 
 249 Id. 
 250 STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 3 (2002). 
 251 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 321 (1991). 
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net-harm function.252  For example, if a manager appropriates $100, 
under a theory of perfect disgorgement (100% discovery/prosecution), he 
or she will pay back only $100 ($100/100%).  If the probability that the 
manager will be discovered and successfully prosecuted is 50%, he or 
she will then pay back $200 if caught ($100/50%).  In other words, the 
lower the probability that the corporate manager will be discovered 
misappropriating funds, the greater the penalty.  For example, a disloyal 
manager who skillfully places stolen assets in an offshore bank account, 
or establishes various sham entities to hide those assets, is less likely to 
be discovered.  That said, the potential penalty is proportionately greater.  
Accordingly, the probability that a disloyal manager will be discovered 
positively correlates to the egregiousness of his or her misconduct.  
Similar to the assignment of liability under tort law, assigning the 
probability that the corporate manager would be discovered is best 
determined by the trier of fact.253 
This “net harm” function implies an inverse relationship between 
punishment and the probability of a successful prosecution.254  A 
successful prosecution includes the cost of investigation.  There are 
number of components to this investigation cost.255  First, as 
shareholders investigate the manager’s actions to ensure loyalty, they 
will do so until the cost associated with the investigation is at most equal 
to the benefit derived by the investigation.256  If shareholders have reason 
to believe that money stolen or opportunities usurped by a manager were 
excessive, more investigations would undoubtedly result.  Second, as 
investigation costs rise, the social costs associated with discovering 
offenses will increase the cost of doing business.257  In other words, 
firms that are successful at litigating against their own managers must 
 252 Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economics Approach, 78 J. POL. ECON. 169 
(1968). 
 253 When a corporation is injured by the breach of a corporate manager’s fiduciary duty, 
shareholders may bring a derivative action to protect their interests.  Schoon v. Smith, 953 A.2d 196, 
199 (Del. 2008) (“a stockholder derivative action is available to redress any breach of fiduciary 
duty . . .”).  Furthermore, the net-harm function applies equally to directors as they too are bound by 
the same fiduciary duties as corporate officers. 
 254 Id.; EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 322 
(1991). 
 255 Investigation costs include discovery, interview, “unmasking the offense, taking 
precautions against similar offenses, and litigation about offenses.”  EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, THE 
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 324 (1991). 
 256 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 321 
(1991) (“The structure of rewards should induce enforcers to expend resources finding and 
prosecuting violations until, at the margin, the last dollar of resources spent on enforcement reduces 
the (cost of manager disloyalty) by just one dollar.”). 
 257 Id. at 324. 
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convince subsequent shareholders that their managers are loyal and that 
the firms themselves are viable investment op 258
Though this “net harm” function increases agency costs 
(investigation costs) at the margin, shareholders will benefit in the 
aggregate through reduced transaction costs.  Given the inverse 
relationship between the probability of successful prosecution and 
punishment, a manager’s utility function is significantly impacted; the 
manager, in a sense, monitors himself or herself.  For example, 
shareholders are currently less willing to investigate disloyal acts, unless 
the money or opportunity stolen was paramount, since their recovery is 
capped (disgorgement).  They are forced to weigh the costs of 
investigation against the extremely low probability of a successful 
prosecution (duty of loyalty laws are extremely deferential to managers).  
Yet, under the “net-harm” function, most of the risk is shifted to 
managers, who must rationalize whether the benefit derived from a 
disloyal act is worth the cost of being successfully prosecuted and thus 
ordered to pay a substantial sum.  In other words, as the risk to 
shareholders increases, the “net-harm” function shifts that risk to the 
managers, acting as a cost-free monitoring system, thereby reducing 
transactional costs. 
Ultimately, the inclusion of such penalty provisions in executive 
compensation plans discourages efficient breaches.259  Under the theory 
of efficient breach, the liability for misappropriation must be sufficiently 
high to reduce the likelihood of breach.260  Figure 3 below represents the 
above statement in a mathematical fashion: 
 
Figure 3: 
 
[Manager’s cost of cooperating > Manager’s liability for 
misappropriating (shareholder’s benefit from performance)] 
 Efficient to misappropriate 
 
[Manager’s cost of cooperating < Manager’s liability for 
misappropriating (shareholder’s benefit from performance)] 
 Efficient to cooperate261 
 
 258 Id. (“[T]ruthful firms must spend (more money) to distinguish themselves from slipshod 
and untruthful firms.”). 
 259 Id. at 317. 
 260 ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 210 (5th ed. 2007). 
 261 Id. at 209. 
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Figure 3 illustrates that when the corporate manager internalizes the cost 
of the misappropriating (liability), he or she then has an efficient 
incentive to perform, which in turn maximizes shareholders’ benefit.262  
In contrast, perfect disgorgement makes a manager indifferent between 
misappropriating and cooperating, all other things being equal.  The 
following formula summarizes this statement: 
 
 
Figure 4: 
 
[Manager’s cost of cooperating = Manager’s liability for 
misappropriating (shareholder’s benefit from performance)] 
 Indifferent between misappropriating or cooperating263 
 
Figures 3 and 4 both illustrate how a contract that seeks to punish a 
disloyal corporate manager can be constructed so as not to overburden 
the manager while at the same time discouraging disloyal acts.  It is 
important to align the corporate manager’s incentives with the 
shareholder’s interests so as to maximize the payout for each party.264 
While this “net-harm” function poses significant advantages, there 
exists the threat of executive flight.  As firms begin including 
disincentive schemes in executive compensation plans, they may initially 
deter managers, even potentially loyal ones, who would prefer to work in 
an environment absent these terms and stress.  “Punishment” terms in 
executive pay plans like the “net-harm” function might send an 
inappropriate signal to the contracting manager that the shareholders’ 
trust in the manager is limited to the job offering, not the guaranteed pay. 
This argument is shortsighted and unrealistic in a capitalistic 
society.  To stave off competitors who might offer lucrative contracts 
excluding these terms, shareholders would offer a combination of 
incentive and disincentive schemes to sweeten the deal.  For example, 
shareholders may reward the manager if his or her performance exceeds 
specifications, resulting in higher pay in comparison to competitors.  
These minimums ought to be designed in relation to industry-wide 
performance standards (e.g., top 25% in the industry) rather than blindly 
tied to an index (e.g., S&P or NYSE).  Ultimately, as these disincentive 
schemes become standardized and harmonized in the executive 
compensation market, shareholders will demand even those truthful and 
loyal companies to incorporate these terms in contracts. 
 262 Id. 
 263 Id. 
 264 STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 3 (2002). 
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CONCLUSION 
The collapse of the market in 2008 highlighted the shortfalls of 
corporate governance schemes, spawning heated debate on Capitol Hill 
as to how best to reform current regulations.265  The legislature is failing 
to note the importance of judge-made law in areas of fiduciary duty by 
focusing solely on disclosure requirements as they relate to executive 
compensation plans.  Even more surprising is the lack of attention given 
to the serviceability of disincentive schemes, particularly discouraging 
manager disloyalty in executive pay plans.  Currently, the primary 
protection allotted to shareholders when a manager violates his or her 
duty of loyalty is disgorgement.266 
Judge Frank H. Easterbrook and Professor Daniel R. Fischel 
summarized the corporate governance reform debate best: “To 
understand corporate law you must understand how the balance of 
advantage among devices for controlling agency costs differs across 
firms and shifts from time to time.”267  Though this passage may seem 
overly romantic and markedly theoretical, Judge Easterbrook and 
Professor Fischel provide essential insight into corporate governance and 
the critical role of transaction costs.  A progeny of contractarianism, 
transactional costs lie at the center of corporate law reform today, with 
scholars examining how best to mitigate these costs through the open 
market as opposed to judicial or legislative measures. 
Mandatory rules like the duty of loyalty—a judicial construct—
serve a critical function in corporate law to reduce transactional agency 
costs.  These reduced costs are evidenced by less manager shirking, 
lower litigation costs, and increased certainty, thus leading to more 
efficient corporate contracts.  As game theory informs us, manager 
disloyalty is not remedied by way of disgorgement, but actually 
incentivizes managers to breach their duty.  Congress must recognize this 
shortfall and seek changes in corporate governance through corporate 
contracts, which would lead to more efficient executive pay plans 
through the adoption of disincentive schemes.  Private corporate 
contracts will seek to reduce transactional costs while protecting 
shareholders’ interests. 
 265 See generally Brian Montopoli, Obama Signs Sweeping Financial Reform into Law, CBS 
NEWS, available at www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-20011201-503544.html (last visited Apr. 
3, 2012) (in signing the Dodd-Frank Act, President Obama stated that “we had to overcome the 
furious lobbying of an array of powerful interest groups, and a partisan minority determined to block 
change”). 
 266 See Casey v. Woodruff, 49 N.Y.S.2d 625 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1944). 
 267 Easterbrook & Fischel, Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. at 
1428. 
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As Carl C. Icahn wrote in the Wall Street Journal, “Nothing will do 
more to improve our economy than corporate governance changes.”268  
Ultimately, as firms evolve in reaction to legislative and judicial reform, 
“those [who fail] to adapt their governance structure are ground under by 
competition.”269 
 268 Carl C. Icahn, The Economy Needs Corporate Governance Reform, WALL ST. J., Jan. 23, 
2009, at A13. 
 269 Id. 
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